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INTRODUCTION
Athan Montgomery was injured twice before he was even fully bom--once by Dr.
Drezga and once by the medical-insurance industry. As a result of Dr. Drezga's
negligence in delivering him, Athan must go through his life with a traumatic brain injury
that has left him unable to fully use his left side, with developmental, cognitive, speech
and balance problems and subject to seizures. And as a result of the medical-insurance
industry's successful lobbying of the Utah Legislature in the mid 1980s, Athan has not
been fully compensated for his injuries. The general damage verdict a unanimous jury
awarded Athan against Dr. Drezga was cut by 80 percent.
A jury found--and it remains undisputed--that, to fairly and adequately compensate
Athan for the noneconomic aspects of his injuries, he should receive $1,250,000. The
trial court awarded Athan only one-fifth of that amount because the legislature, without
any knowledge of Athan or the facts of his case, determined that no one injured by
medical negligence should ever receive more than $250,000 in noneconomic damages. 1
Dr. Drezga and the amici would have this court abdicate its responsibility and
defer to the legislature in determining the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act's damage cap. While some legislative enactments may be entitled to
deference, when the legislature deprives injured children of their right to a complete

Although the damage cap was increased in 2001 to try to keep up with
inflation and although Dr. Drezga repeatedly refers to the cap as a $400,000 cap, the cap
at issue here is the $250,000 cap applicable to cases that arose before July 1,2001, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1996).
1

remedy for their injuries, heightened scrutiny is required. The damage cap cannot pass
such scrutiny. The damage cap is unconstitutional because it violates Athan
Montgomery's constitutional rights to a remedy, to due process, to the uniform operation
of the laws and to a jury trial. It also violates the constitutionally mandated separation of
powers.
The plaintiffs will fIrst address the general arguments of Dr. Drezga and the amici
and then address their specifIc constitutional arguments.

ARGUMENT

I.

LEE v. GAUFIN'S HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS IN UTAH IS DISPOSITIVE OF
THIS CASE.
Dr. Drezga argues generally that the damage cap is constitutional because the

legislature had good reasons to pass the cap, and the cap has achieved its intended
purpose. The damage cap was passed without any statement of legislative purpose. Dr.
Drezga claims, however, that the purpose of the cap is the same as the purpose of the
original malpractice act, namely, to keep down medical malpractice insurance rates in
Utah so that health-care providers could obtain affordable insurance. (Br. of Aplee at 5.)

2

This court has already rejected the argument that a medical malpractice insurance
crisis existed that justified the legislature in limiting the rights of an injured minor to seek
a full and fair remedy for his injuries. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 583-89 (Utah 1993).2
Dr. Drezga tries to distinguish Lee on the grounds that the information it reviewed
was only what was before the legislature in 1976, when it first passed the malpractice act,
and not what was before the legislature in 1986, when it passed the cap. (Br. of Aplee at
29.) There are several problems with this argument.
First, because the damage cap infringes on constitutional rights (including the right
to a remedy, the right to the uniform operation of the law and the right to a jury trial, as
discussed more fully below), the burden was not on the plaintiffs to show that the
legislative history of the damage cap was inadequate to support the cap. Rather, the
burden was on Dr. Drezga to show that the damage cap was "a reasonable, nonarbitrary
means for lowering medical malpractice premiums in Utah." Lee, 867 P.2d at 592
(Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result, joined by Hall, C.J.). See also, e.g., id. at 591;
Swayne v. L.D.S Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637,647 n.l (Utah 1990) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring & dissenting); Velarde v. Board ofReview of Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 831
P.2d 123, 128 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Although the damage cap has its own legislative
history, Dr. Drezga relies primarily on the history of and purported justifications for the
original malpractice act, enacted in 1976, to support the damage cap. (See Br. of Aplee at

Lee struck down the malpractice act's statute of limitations as applied to
minors, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4(2).
2
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5,28Y Neither he nor the health-care amici have shown what the legislature considered
in enacting the cap in 1986. 4 Cf Magleby, supra note 3, at 252 (''the nwnerical analysis
3
The only legislative history from the 1986 act that either Dr. Drezga or the
amici cite is comments in the floor debates arguing that the cap would result in a 20%
reduction in medical malpractice insurance rates, which were blamed for costing
conswners an extra $45 a day for hospital stays. (Br. of Aplee at 8 n.8 (citing James E.
Magleby, The Constitutionality of Utah's Medical Malpractice Damages Cap Under the
Utah Constitution, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 251 (1995), an article that, incidentally,
concluded that the damage cap would probably be found unconstitutional.) ''No report on
these figures was ever published by a legislative committee." Magleby, supra, at 251
n.183. The 20% figure was based on a New York study, see Remarks of Sen. Barlow,
Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #21), and ''the medical and legal
environments in New York differ substantially from those in Utah," Matthew K.
Richards, Comment, The Utah Medical No-fault Proposal: A Problem-fraught Rejection
of the Current Tort System, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 103, 116. In fact, the rates for the Utah
Medical Insurance Association (UMIA), the largest malpractice insurer in Utah,
increased 23.8% from the time the act took effect July 1, 1986, to 1994. (See Br. of
Amici Curiae Intermountain Health Care, Inc., et al. [hereinafter "IHC Br."], addendum at
15.) Moreover, the $45 a day figure was based on a Missouri survey that had nothing to
do with Utah. See Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc
#21).

The health-care amici rely principally on the 1994 Tillinghast report that
two of them (along with UMIA) commissioned. They have not shown that the legislature
knew about, much less considered, the substance of the Tillinghast report when it enacted
the damage cap in 1986, nor have they cited any authority for considering such post-hoc
justifications in determining whether the legislature had a sufficient basis for enacting the
cap. The Tillinghast report does not show that any increase in insurance premiums for
Utah physicians was attributable to large jury awards in Utah malpractice cases or that a
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages would significantly reduce premiums, and,
indeed, it could not, since in 1986 there had never been an award of noneconomic
damages in Utah even half the size of the cap. See Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate,
Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). In fact, other studies have shown that the alleged
crisis of the mid 1980s was not primarily caused by jury verdicts. See infra note 34.
Moreover, any suggestion in the Tillinghast report that the damage cap was effective in
meeting its objective is dubious at best. As the Tillinghast report acknowledged, the
damage cap applied only to claims occurring after its effective date (July 1, 1986), and it
took over four years to resolve claims for more than $100,000. (See IHC Br. addendum at
94.) Yet the fortunes of malpractice insurers in Utah began to improve almost
4
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conducted in Lee is probably still valid, unless the state can produce new evidence of a
sudden increase in malpractice cases and the size of their verdicts").
Second, in Lee this court relied in part on data from the 1980s, including
information as recent as 1987, in rejecting the proposition that a medical malpractice
crisis justified placing discriminatory limitations on the malpractice claims of minors.

See 867 P.2d at 584, 587-89. 5 That information included evidence that, from 1979
through 1983, UMIA collected over $13 million in premiwns and earned $4.3 million in
investments and had unpaid losses of about $8.3 million. 867 P .2d at 587 n.24. 6 Based
on such evidence, this court in Lee rejected the notion that there was a medical
malpractice insurance crisis in Utah as late as 1983, just three years before the cap was
enacted. See id. at 587 n.24 (citing UMIA Financial Statement for 1983; Best's Insurance

immediately. (See, e.g., id. at 105-06.) For 1988, medical malpractice insurers in Utah
collected $22.8 million in premiwns and incurred only $4.7 million in losses. UTAH
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO Gov. NORMAN H. BANGERTER: BUSINESS OF 1988,
at 31 (addendum at 2). Not surprisingly, the insurance industry's recovery coincided with
the nation's economic recovery as a whole. The Dow Jones Industrial average decreased
in 1988 and then rose steadily for the next thirteen years, until the next alleged
malpractice crisis in 2001. See, e.g., www.jamesbaker.comldataldjia.htm.
Some of the data the court relied on, such as the Utah State Medical
Association's Medical Care Cost Containment Proposals, cited at 867 P.2d at 587, was
actually part of the legislative history for the 1986 damage cap. See Mins. of the Agric. &
Health Study Connn., May 16, 1984, attachment.
5

For 1985, the year before the damage cap was enacted, medical malpractice
insurers in Utah wrote $12,021,561 in premiwns and paid losses of$10,366,172. UTAH
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO NORMAN H. BANGERTER ... : BUSINESS OF 1985,
at 18 (addendum at 4). Thus, even at the height of the so-called crisis, malpractice
insurers in Utah were still making money.
6
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Reports for Property-Casualty Companies, 1983). Moreover, from the empirical
evidence that was available in 1986, when the legislature enacted the cap, it was not at all
clear that a damage cap would reduce premiums, especially enough to make any
difference in health-care costs. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the

Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 91.

HEALTH

POL., POL'y & L. 629, 629, 639-43 (1985).
Third, the legislative history of the 1986 act suffers from the same defects this
court found in the 1976 act. It does not show that there was any crisis in Utah--in terms
of either malpractice verdicts or the unavailability of malpractice insurance--at the time
the bill was passed. In fact, it shows just the opposite.
Senator Haven Barlow, the bill's sponsor, admitted that there had never been any
award in Utah for pain and suffering higher than $100,000. Remarks of Sen. Barlow,
Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). Senator Barlow also admitted that he
was not aware of any Utah doctors who had stopped delivering babies because of the cost
of malpractice insurance. Id. (audograph disc #21.) See also Remarks of Sen. Hillyard,
Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #21) ("you admit here on the floor of the
Senate that there is no problem with this right now"). Moreover, the number of medical
malpractice cases filed in Utah had been cut in half the previous year. Remarks of Sen.
Matheson, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #21). Cf Lee, at 867 P.2d at 585 (rejecting the
claim of a crisis in part because claims in Utah had been decreasing). Nevertheless,
Senator Barlow thought that the bill was necessary, not so much to address a crisis in
6

Utah, but to send a message to insurers that Utah was doing something about medical
malpractice insurance. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph
disc #21).
Although the Utah State Medical Association claimed that ''there have been a few
substantial awards in this state,,,7 it acknowledged that "certain states have a much greater
problem than Utah." Utah State Medical Association, Medical Care Cost Containment

Proposals 17 (Mar. 1984).8
The legislative committee considering the proposed legislation reviewed a
memorandum from the state Insurance Commissioner that stated, "Medical malpractice
7
Senator Barlow noted one jury verdict for $4.3 million in Utah County three
years earlier. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20).
The verdict (actually for $4,775,000 in 1982) was for a newborn, who suffered severe
brain damage during delivery resulting in spastic quadriplegia, and for his mother, who
suffered a ruptured uterus, necessitating a hysterectomy. Their claimed future economic
losses alone were $7 million. See Hunter v. Lewis, NR No. 17446, 1982 WL 244812.
Senator Barlow also noted two recent settlements over $2 million each but acknowledged
that both were for economic losses and would not have been affected by the damage cap.
Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20).
Utah has traditionally had some of the lowest malpractice verdicts in the
United States. See Magleby, supra note 3, at 252 (footnote omitted). In fact, for the
period from September 1, 1990, through December 31,2000, Utah ranked 50th in the
nation in median malpractice payments. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., National
Practitioner Data Bank 2000 Annual Report, table 9 (addendum at 7). The legislative
committee considering the cap reviewed a paper commissioned by the Insurance
Corporation of America that admitted that, "[a]lthough concern about the malpractice
crisis [of the 1970s] was nationwide, subsequent studies have indicated that a true crisis
existed in only nine states," and Utah was not one of them. Karen Zellars & Jed
Robinson, Limitations on Damages for Acts of Medical Malpractice: Are Ceilings
Constitutional? (Jan. 1982) (attached to the committee's Sept. 21, 1983 minutes), at 2 &
n.4. The authors noted that, of 13 states that had passed damage caps, 10 "apparently did
not have a crisis at the time their statute was enacted." Id. at 2.
8
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rates in Utah are still among the lowest in the country," and concluded that "medical
malpractice rates in Utah are not excessive." Memo. from Roger C. Day to Members of
the Agric. & Health Interim Study Comm., Aug. 16, 1983, at 2, attached to Mins. of
Agric. & Health Study Comm., Sept. 21, 1983. The Commissioner also noted,
"Additional companies are continually entering the market to provide medical
malpractice coverage for Utah doctors. This will continue to improve the competitiveness
of the Utah marketplace." Id. 9
The legislative history also does not show that a $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages would likely make malpractice insurance more available in Utah. Senator
Matheson related the experience of a Utah hospital that had its insurance canceled, not
because any claims had been made against it but because of two lawsuits in California
that caused its insurer to cancel all its policies. See Remarks of Sen. Matheson, Utah
Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #21). As one senator stated, "[Y]ou pass a law that
limits a right to recovery for Utah citizens, but by the same token, our health-care
providers are paying insurance based on a national standard, and we end up with no real
influence on what happened here." Remarks of Sen. Hillyard, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986
(audograph disc #21).

By the end of 1985, there were 42 insurers writing medical malpractice
insurance in Utah. UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO NORMAN H. BANGERTER
... : BUSINESS OF 1985, at 27 (addendum at 5).
9
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To the extent that Utah insurance rates were based on Utah experience, the
evidence did not show that the cap was necessary to keep malpractice rates low because
there had never been a verdict in Utah for pain and suffering of $100,000, let alone
$250,000. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20).
In passing the damage cap, the House acknowledged that the cause of the alleged
insurance crisis was not malpractice awards but insurance companies setting their
premiums too low to get an adequate return for their investors. See Remarks of Reps.
Fox, Holt and Sykes, Utah House of Representatives, Feb. 12, 1986 (record #3). See alsl

infra note 33.
The same cost containment proposals that the Lee court cited to show that "the
dominant causes of increased health-care costs were other than increased malpractice
insurance premiums," 867 P.2d at 587, also admitted, "Setting the size of the limit [on
noneconomic damages] is arbitrary." Utah State Medical Association, supra, at 17.
In short, there is no evidence before the court that the legislature properly found
either that a crisis existed in Utah or that a $250,000 damage cap--or any cap at all--was
necessary to assure continued affordable malpractice insurance or health care in Utah. 10

10
Moreover, there is evidence that damage caps do not in fact lower
premiums, at least not significantly. See, e.g., Lee, 867 P.2d at 587 (notwithstanding tort
reform legislation, "malpractice premiums have continued to rise, while the ratio of
physicians' malpractice insurance costs to physicians' incomes nationally has not
changed significantly") (citing Glen O. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the
1970s: A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,31 (1986». See also Statement
of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy in Opp'n to the Med. Malpractice Amend., July 26,2002
(addendum at 10-11); William P. Gronfein & Elenor DeArman Kinney, Controlling

9

But even if damage caps lower premiums, as Dr. Drezga and the amici claim, that
does not mean that they are constitutional. Theoretically, one could stabilize insurance
premiums by limiting medical malpractice damages to $1 or by immunizing doctors from

all liability, yet such draconian steps would clearly be unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366 (Utah 1989) (striking down a
$100,000 cap on total damages against the University Hospital); Masich v. United States

Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612,624 ("If the legislature
were to abolish all compensation and all common law rights for negligence ... , no
contention could reasonably be made that it was a proper exercise of the police power"),

Large Malpractice Claims: The Unexpected Impact of Damage Caps, 161. HEALTH
POL., POL'y & L. 441, 458 (1991). In fact, in California, which has had a $250,000 cap
on noneconomic damages since 1975, the mean medical malpractice premium for selfemployed physicians in 1998 was 19% higher than the national average and the median
was the same. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN SOCIOECONOMIC
STATISTICS, 2000-2002 EDITION 67 (John D. Wassenaar & Sara L. Thran eds., 2001). In
1994, California had the seventh highest insurance premiums in the nation for orthopedic
surgeons. David Frum & Frank Wolfe, !fYou Gotta Get Sued, Get Sued in Utah,
FORBES, Jan. 17, 1994, at 70, 72. Despite Utah's damage cap, premiums for Utah's
largest malpractice insurer, UMIA, have increased 95.8% since the cap was enacted. (See
IHC Br., addendum at 15.) The American Insurance Association (AlA), an insurance
industry trade association, and tort reform advocates have denied promising that tort
reform measures like the damage cap would reduce insurance rates. See AlA Press
Release, Mar. 13,2002 ("Insurers never promised that tort reform would achieve specific
savings") (addendum at 15); Michael Prince, Tort Reforms Don't Cut Liability Rates,
Study Says, BUSINESS INS., July 19, 1999, at 73 (addendum at 17, 18). In Nevada, after
successfully lobbying for a $350,000 damage cap, one of the largest insurers of Clark
County OB/GYNs, said it had no plans to lower its premiums because "[m]eaningful tort
reform was not expected to dramatically change the pricing of insurance premiums." See
Joelle Babula, State Insurance Program Holds Off on Lowering Rates, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Aug. 14,2002 (addendum at 20).
10

appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948). An arbitrary cap of $250,000 on noneconomic
damages is no more constitutional.

II.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "HARD" AND "SOFT" DAMAGES IS
IRRELEVANT IN THIS CASE.
Dr. Drezga suggests that limitations on noneconomic (so-called general) damages

are legitimate because such damages are "soft," as opposed to ''hard'' economic damages

(e.g., Br. of Aplee at 30-32,35-36), meaning that the former are harder to calculate than
the latter and hence more susceptible to abuse. That is not true in this case. The jury
awarded $1,022,735.30 in economic damages ($22,735.30 in past special damages and
$1,000,000 in future special damages) and $1,250,000 in noneconomic damages. (R.
360.) Dr. Drezga never challenged either the amount of noneconomic damages nor the
evidence to support them--not at trial, not in a post-trial motion, and not on appeal. If a
party thinks a jury's award of damages is excessive or was influenced by passion or
prejudice, the law provides ways to challenge the award. See, e.g., UTAH R. ClV. P. 50 &
59. Dr. Drezga never availed himself of these remedies. Instead, he has "accede[d]" to
the plaintiffs' statement of facts (Br. of Aplee at 2), which provides a sufficient
evidentiary basis for the award of $ 1,250,000 in noneconomic damages. Where, as here,
the jury has fixed the amount of damages and those amounts are unchallenged, both
general (noneconomic) and special (economic) damages are equally "hard," or frrm.

11

Moreover, studies show that juries do not differ significantly from supposedly
more rational, less emotional decisionmakers in assessing and evaluating noneconomic
damages. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 221-35 (1995); Roselle L. Wissler et aI.,

Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and
Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REv. 751, 812-13 (1999); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the
American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 849, 898 (1998);
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending

Empiricism, 77CORNELLL.REv. 1124, 1141 (1992).11

Studies have also contradicted the implicit assumption of Dr. Drezga's
argument, namely, that juries are "anti-doctor" and are swayed by their emotions in
giving unfair, "windfall" awards to undeserving patients. Any bias seems to run in the
opposite direction. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort
System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 398 (1999) (reporting
the results of a study that "dramatically illustrate [s] pro-defendant trends" in medical
malpractice and other cases); Thomas B. Metzloff, Researching Litigation: The Medical
Malpractice Example, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199,236 (Autumn 1988) (studies
show "there is little support for the contention that juries in malpractice cases are proplaintiff and consistently inclined to award large sums of money to prevailing plaintiffs").
One study, for example, found that plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases win at trial at a
much higher rate before judges than before juries and that recoveries in bench trials are
higher than recoveries injury trials. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra, at 1126, 1137-38,
1177. The authors found "little support for the widespread perception that juries are
biased or incompetent." Id. at 1126. See also Kenneth Jost, Still Warring Over Medical
Malpractice: Timefor Something Better, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 68, 70 (citing two
studies, one by Duke University School of Law researchers that found that juries ruled in
favor of doctors in 13 of 17 cases insurers rated as tossups and in 6 of 11 cases they
expected to lose, and a New Jersey study that showed that doctors won 76% of tried cases
and that juries typically did not consider the severity of the patient's injury in deciding
11
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Often, as in this case, noneconomic damages are more significant than economic
damages, and a cap on the former denies the victim of malpractice the compensation he or
she needs most:
The importance of these nonpecuniary losses can be seen by asking
yourself whether you would be indifferent or even nearly indifferent
between an uninjured state and a severely injured state, such as paraplegia,
blindness, or severe brain damage, so long as your income and wealth
remained constant. Your answer reveals the depth of nonpecuniary
components captured roughly under the rubric of pain and suffering.
Income and wealth are only in service of those myriad activities that make
up life and living. These activities are the primary elements of life;
pecuniary elements are secondary. It turns reality on its head to give
transcendence to the pecuniary.[12]
Neal K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65

N.Y.V. L. REv. 23, 58 (1990) (footnote omitted).
liability). See generally VIDMAR, supra page 12, at 161-82 (summarizing the research
and concluding that, "[o]n balance, juries may have a slight bias in favor of doctors").
Studies also show that juries under-compensate, especially for serious losses. E.g.,
FRANKA. SLOANET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 198,206,223 (1993).
Moreover, the large verdicts frequently cited are misleading because they do not
reflect the vast majority of cases that settle for nothing or nominal amounts. See Jost,
supra, at 71; A. Russell Localio, Variations on $962,258: The Misuse of Data on
Medical Malpractice, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 126, 126 (1985). Nor do they
accurately reflect the size of verdicts even where plaintiffs recover. See William
Glaberson, When the Verdict Is Just a Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, § 4, at 6
(addendum at 23) (the average size of a verdict in the New York area reported in 1989 in
the New York Times was $20.5 million, whereas the actual average verdict was only $1.1
million). Thus, policy makers "'can't reliably use their impressions from reading the
press about issues like whether the court system is out of control,'" yet they do. Id.
(quoting Oscar G. Chase, an NYU law professor who conducted the study of verdict sizes
reported in the media).
12
Not only that, but by allowing full recovery for economic damages while
capping noneconomic damages, the statute assures full compensation to the medical
insurance industry while denying it to the innocent victim of malpractice.
13

III.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE ALSO IRRELEVANT IN THIS CASE.
Dr. Drezga also suggests that the victims of malpractice are not left without an

adequate remedy because they can collect unlimited punitive damages. Punitive damages
are a red herring, for several reasons. First, punitive damages are not meant to
compensate the plaintiff for his or her injuries. They are a '"quasi-criminal''' remedy
meant to punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing. Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (citations omitted). Second,
punitive damages can only be awarded for egregious misconduct--''willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18l(1)(a). Negligence--even gross negligence--is not enough. Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah
295, 117 P. 54, 57 (1911). As bad as Dr. Drezga's misconduct was, no one ever
suggested he should be liable for punitive damages. (See R. 1-22.) Third, punitive
damages have never been awarded for a medical malpractice case in Utah. See, e.g.,
Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20). Fourth, half
of all punitive damages over $20,000 do not go to the injured plaintiff but to the State of
Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3)(a). Fifth, punitive damages cannot be insured
against under Utah law. Id. § 31A-20-101(4). This may explain why the insurance lobby
was willing to throw the victims of medical malpractice this hollow bone.
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IV.

THIS COURT'S DECISIONS DO NOT EVIDENCE A TREND TOWARD
MORE DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Dr. Drezga also argues that there is a "discemable trend" in this court's decisions

towards a more deferential, less skeptical approach to "tort-limiting legislation applicable
to private parties or governments perfonning non-governmental functions." (See Br. of
Apleeat 16-17.)13 The cases he cites do not support that proposition.

In two of the cases, the court rejected constitutional challenges to the
Governmental Immunity Act's damage cap. Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, 53
P.3d 473; Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19,5 P.3d 616. However, both those cases involved
governmental actors perfonning core governmental functions. See Parks, 2002 UT 55,

~

14; Lyon, 2000 UT 19, ~~ 42-43. This court has consistently held that damages arising
out of the performance of a core governmental function may constitutionally be limited

Dr. Drezga also suggests that there is a trend in the legislature to limit tort
remedies. (See Br. of Aplee at 13-14 (citing various statutes).) If that is true, it is all the
more reason the court should not defer to the legislative judgment. The judiciary is the
only branch of government that is truly independent. The legislature is subject to intense
political and special interest pressure. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
625 (1954); Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler MIg. Co., 1999 UT 18, ~ 36,974
P .2d 1194 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted); CHARLES LEWIS & CENTER FOR
PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE CONGRESS: How SPECIAL INTERESTS HAVB
STOLEN YOUR RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 2-8, 41-45
(1998). When the legislature is willing to sacrifice the rights of injured people--those
most in need of protection and least able to protect themselves--to the interests of
powerful corporations and industries, such as the medical and insurance industries, it is
only the courts that stand between the people and tyranny. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78,
at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (William R. Brock ed., 1996) (''the courts were designed to
be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, among other
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority").
13
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because, but for the government's waiver of its sovereign immunity, there could be no
liability, and the same act that creates liability can also limit it. See, e.g., McCorvey v.
Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 868 P.2d 41,47-48 (Utah 1993).14
By contrast, people injured by medical malpractice in Utah have always been able
to sue their negligent health-care providers. 15 The malpractice act did not create a
liability that otherwise would not have existed; instead, it limited remedies for an existing
liability.

In Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Manufacturing Company, 1999 UT
18, 974 P.2d 1194, the court upheld the new builders statute of repose after having held
the prior statute unconstitutional. However, the court did not defer to the legislature but
exercised its constitutional role to review the reasonableness of the legislation under the
test set out in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670,680 (Utah 1985). See 1999
UT 18, ~~ 15-23. 16

Similarly, in Hirpa v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997), also
14
cited by Dr. Drezga, the court held that Utah's Good Samaritan Act, which immunized
doctors from liability under certain circumstances, did not violate the open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution because, even without the act, the defendant had no
duty to act and hence no liability.
15
See, e.g., Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984); Nixdorfv.
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980); Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199,436 P.2d 435
(1968); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937); Everts v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238,
197 P. 1043 (1921); Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hosp. Ass'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 P.
691 (1907).

16
The court in Craftsman emphasized that the new statute was "substantially
different" from the old one, 1999 UT 18, ~ 19, that the new statute added significant
safeguards for injured persons, id. ~ 22, and that there was undisputed evidence that the
16

Finally, in Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 VT 79, 453 Vtah Adv. Rep. 40, a majority
of this court reaffmned Berry as stating the test to be applied in detennining the
constitutionality of legislation that impinges on one's right to a remedy under article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution. See 2002 UT 79,

~~

29,41-48, 72 (Durham, C.J.,

with Howe, 1., concurring) & 79 & 81 (Russon,1.).17 The court in Laney did not defer to
the legislature'S judgment that all acts of municipalities (specifically, the operation of an
electrical power system) are governmental functions but instead held the statute at issue
there unconstitutional. See 2002 UT 79, ~~ 65-71.18

new statute would cut off less than 1% of valid claims, id. ~~ 21, 23. The damage cap at
issue here does not provide any safeguards for those most seriously injured but, as in this
case, deprives them of a substantial percentage of their actual damages.
The amici can be excused for not citing Laney in their briefs because the
decision came out after they filed their briefs. The health-care amici have submitted to
the court as "supplemental authority" a new federal government report that is irrelevant to
the issue of the 1986 damage cap, yet neither they nor the State has identified Laney as
new, supplemental authority. One can only assume they have not done so because they
thought that the court was well aware of the decision and of its relevance to this case and
that Dr. Drezga had adequately covered it in his brief.
17

The plaintiffs are at a loss to understand how the court's conclusion in
Laney that the legislature had not specifically identified any "clear social or economic
evil" and that ''the broad sweep of the [statute] is arbitrary and unreasonable" as applied,
2002 UT 79, ~ 71, is "consistent with a de facto more deferential approach" to the
legislative judgment, as Dr. Drezga claims (Br. of Aplee at 17).
18
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v.

THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES THE RIGHT-TO-A-REMEDY
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 11.
A.

Berry v. Beech Aircraft States the Test for Determining
Constitutionality Under Article I, Section 11.

In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), this court held that a
statute that deprives an injured person of a remedy satisfies article I, section 11 of the
Utah Constitution if it provides him with "an effective and reasonable alternative remedy
'by due course of law' for vindication of his constitutional rights." 717 P.2d at 680. Ifit
does not, it "may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id. (citations omitted). Dr. Drezga
criticizes the Berry test but stops short of asking the court to overrule Berry. (See Br. of
Aplee at 14-25.) The State of Utah, on the other hand, urges the court to abandon the
Berry test, claiming it exalts the judicial branch over the legislative branch. (Br. of

Amicus Curiae - State of Utah [hereinafter "State Br."] at 3_26.)19

19
If the State's amicus brief sounds familiar, it is because it repeats, often
verbatim, arguments the State has made--and this court has rejected--in other cases,
including Parks, No. 991023-SC, 2002 UT 55, and Laney, No. 981729-SC, 2002 UT 79.
However, the State has backtracked from the extreme position it took earlier, that article
I, section 11 was meant only as a limit on the judiciary and not on the legislature.
Instead, it now argues that the legislature should be able to alter the common law "so long
as its enactments are not arbitrary or completely unreasonable." (State Br. at 14.) Thus,
not even the State advocates the minority position Justices Wilkins and Durrant took in
Laney, namely, that article I, section 11 only guarantees procedural rights (i.e., the right to
go to court) and offers no substantive protection. See 2002 UT 79, ~ 132 (Wilkins, 1.,
concurring & dissenting).
18

The State's argument ignores precedent and rejects the most recent pronouncement
of this court. In a "long line of cases," from Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining &

Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948), to the
present, the nearly ''unanimous view of each and every justice of this Court who has ever
ruled on the construction of Article I, section II--some thirteen justices in all"--has been
''that Article I, section 11 imposer s] a substantive guarantee of a remedy by due course of
law that the Legislature [can] not ignore without having a substantial, nonarbitrary basis
for doing SO."20 Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 38 & 86 (Stewart, J., concurring).21 This
court's construction of the open courts provision is consistent with the vast majority of
decisions from other jurisdictions construing similar constitutional provisions. See

Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~ 33 (of the thirty-eight jurisdictions that have an open courts
provision, "most courts 'interpret the remedy guarantee to proscribe [at least] some

20
The only exceptions are Justices Zimmerman, Wilkins and Durrant. For
nearly fifteen years, Justice Zimmerman agreed with the court's article I, section 11
jurisprudence and, in fact, forcefully defended its philosophical underpinnings in
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348,367-68 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in part). Shortly before he left the bench, he abruptly changed his position.
See Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ,-r~ 108-55 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). Justice Wilkins
(joined by Justice Durrant) agreed with Justice Zimmerman's position in Laney, 2002 UT
79, ~~ 85-139 (Wilkins, J., concurring & dissenting, joined by Durrant, Assoc. C.J.).

Justices Russon and Durham agreed with the analysis of the open courts
provision set out in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Craftsman. See Craftsman,
1999 UT 19, ~ 15 n.5 & ~ 103. Thus, that opinion represented the view of the majority of
the court. See also Day v. State ex rei. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, ~ 37 n.9,
980 P .2d 1171.
21

19

legislation affecting remedies .... "') (quoting David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy,
65 TEMP. L. REv. 1197, 1208 (1992».22
Despite the State's repeated efforts to overthrow Berry, it remains the law of this
state. The Berry test has been applied in numerous cases over the last seventeen years,23
and the court recently reaffmned its place in its article I, section 11 jurisprudence. See

Laney, 2002 UT 79,

~

47 (Durham, J., with Howe, J., concurring) &

~~

79 & 81 (Russon,

1., concurring).
Dr. Drezga cites Laney primarily for its dissent, but the position of the dissenters
has never carried a majority of this court. If the rule of stare decisis and "principles of
institutional integrity," see Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-

Even those courts that the State claims review legislative enactments more
deferentially under an open courts provision recognize that there are limits to what the
legislature may do: "Certainly, the legislature may not declare to be right that which is
essentially wrong, nor say that which is a definite, substantial injury to fundamental
rights to be no injury, nor abolish a remedy given by the common law to essential rights
without affording another remedy substantially adequate." Gallegher v. Davis, 183 A.
620,624 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936) (emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds by
Wagner v. Chanks, 194 A.2d 701 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963).
22

See, e.g., Laney, 2002 UT 79, ~~ 49-71 (per Durham, J.) & 82 (Russon, J.,
concurring); Day, 1999 UT 46, ~~ 40-48, 980 P .2d 1171; Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 1523, 974 P.2d 1194; Hirpa, 948 P.2d 785, 792-94; Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 116266 (Utah 1996); Lee, 867 P.2d 572,581 (majority opinion) & 590-92 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring); Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091-96 (Utah 1989); Sun
Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 191-93 (Utah
1989); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 357-61 (per Durham, 1.) & 366-69 (Zimmerman, 1.,
concurring in part); Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 559-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362, 1365-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 870
P.2d 957 (Utah 1994); Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 831 P.2d 123, 12530 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
23
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46 (1992), are to mean anything, the court should reject any argument to abandon the

Berry test. If a court were to abandon established precedents with each change in its
composition, the public would soon lose faith in the judicial process. See State v.

Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289,292 (Utah 1995) (stare decisis "reinforces confidence in
judicial integrity"). "[N]o judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue
afresh in every case that raised it. . .. Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law
underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is, by defmition, indispensable." Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854
(citations omitted). Thus, "arguments which in their ultimate formulation" conclude that

Berry should be overruled, as well as any "reservations" individual members of the court
may have about reaffmning Berry, should be outweighed by "the force of stare decisis. "

See id. at 853.

B.

Article I, Section 11 Does Not Constitutionalize the Common Law.

The State of Utah persists in making an argument that this court has repeatedly
rejected, namely, that this court's interpretation of article I, section 11 of the Utah
Constitution impennissibly constitutionalizes the common law. 24 See, e.g., Day, 1999 UT

The State also suggests that Utah historically rejected the common law.
The early Mormon pioneers spurned the common law because it outlawed polygamy and
because of their distrust of the non-Mormon judges the federal government sent to
enforce it. See Michael W. Homer, The Judiciary and the Common Law in Utah
Territory, 1850-61,21 DIALOGUE 97, 98 (1988). By the time Utah became a state in
1896, the Mormon Church had abandoned polygamy, see DOCTRINE & COVENANTS
24

21

46,

~~

35-37,980 P.2d 1171; Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 39 & 68-70,90-99 (Stewart, J.,

concurring); DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,435-36 (Utah 1995); Horton, 785 P.2d at

1090-91; Cruz v. Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1988); Berry, 717 P.2d at 676 (citation
omitted). See also Ross, 920 P.2d at 1169 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding
the flatly erroneous assertions to the contrary by the Attorney General, ... this Court has
made it abundantly clear that the guaranteed remedy provision of the open courts clause
does not constitutionalize the common law") (citations omitted). 25 In determining what
the framers intended by a "remedy by due course of law," the court can look to the legal

Official Decl. I, and Utah had accepted the common law, see, e.g., Thomas v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., I Utah 232,234 (1875) ("Although the Common Law has not been adopted in
this Territory by any Statute, we entertain no doubt that it should be regarded as
prevailing here, so far as it is not incompatible with our situation and government, and
that it is to be resorted to as furnishing ... the measure of personal rights and the rule of
judicial decision"); First Nat 'I Bank of Utah v. Kinner, I Utah 100, 107 (1873) (the
people of Utah have ''tacitly agreed upon maxims and principles of the Common Law
suited to their conditions and consistent with the Constitution and Laws of the United
States"). The first code of the new state expressly adopted the common law of England
"so far as it was not repugnant to, or in conflict with," Utah or federal law. REv. STAT. OF
UTAH § 2488 (1898), now codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1. Whatever the early
Mormon pioneers thought of the common law in the 1850s, by 1896, when the Utah
Constitution was adopted, the historical antipathy toward the common law had softened,
and public distrust had shifted away from the courts and toward legislatures, with their
ties to big business and powerful corporations. See, e.g., Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 5054 (Stewart, J., concurring), and authorities cited therein.
Although this court has denied that article I, section 11 constitutionalizes
the common law, the history of the origins of right-to-remedy provisions in this country
suggests that they were in fact meant to prevent legislatures from overriding common-law
rights. See Ned Miltenberg, The Revolutionary "Right to a Remedy, "TRIAL, Mar. 1998,
at 48, 52. "In the fmal analysis, the issue is not ... a legislature'S abstract 'right to alter
the common law.' This power, of course, exists, but only so long as legislative' change [s]
doD not interfere with constitutional rights. ,,, Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
25
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rights and remedies that existed when the constitution was adopted, but that is just the
beginning of the court's analysis, not the end. See Lyon, 2000 UT 19, ~ 35, 5 P.3d 616
(Stewart, 1., concurring) (citing DeBry, 889 P.2d 428).
The wrong that article I, section 11 was meant to address was the abolition of
remedies to redress injuries done to a person "in his person, property or reputation." The
threat to a remedy may come from any of the three branches of government--the
legislative, executive or judicial branch. There is nothing in the text or history of article I,
section 11 to show that the framers intended it to apply to only one branch and not the
others. 26 Constitutional limitations "are not peculiar to anyone branch of the
government" but apply to each department; ''they are imposed as a security to the rights
of the principal,-the people." Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah 345, 47 P. 670, 675 (1896)
(Bartch, 1., concurring).27 A construction of article I, section 11 that did not limit the
legislature'S ability to alter or abolish established remedies would do "violence to logic as
well as tradition." JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2(c), at 352 (2d
ed. 1996).

26
At the time Utah adopted article I, section 11, such a provision was "in
nearly every constitution and declaration of rights in the country. It [was] a provision that
has come to us with the approval of the ages." 1 OFFICIAL REpORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION ... TO ADOPT A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF
UTAH 304 (1898). At that time, the evil the remedy guarantee was meant to redress ''was
renegade legislatures." See Schuman, supra page 20, at 1201.
27
Justice Miner joined Justice Bartch's concurring opinion in Ritchie, making
it the opinion of the three-member court. See 47 P. at 681 (Miner, J., concurring).
23

The State quotes dicta from one early Utah case to the effect that article I, section
11 "applies only to judicial questions. It is not meant thereby that this court may reach

out and usurp powers which belong to another independent and co-ordinate branch of the
state government." (State Br. at 7 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co.,
52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556, 563 (1918)).) Although the court did not defme what it meant

by 'judicial question," determining whether a statute violates an express constitutional
provision has always been a 'judicial question."28 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87,
Ill, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803) ("if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case, conformable to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformable to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting
rules governs the case: this is of the very essence of judicial duty").

c.

The Court's Interpretation of Article I, Section 11 Does Not Violate the
Separation of Powers.

The State argues that this court's interpretation of article I, section 11 violates the
separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution, article V, section 1.

The issue in Utah Light was whether the legislature could properly limit
judicial review of an order of the Public Utilities Commission approving a rate increase.
Although the statute in question provided that the commission's fmdings and conclusions
on questions of fact "'shall be fmal and shall not be subject to review,'" see 173 P. at 558,
the court nevertheless reviewed the commission's fmdings to determine whether there
was substantial evidence to support them. See id. at 563. Thus, even in the case the State
relies on, the court did not simply defer to the legislature'S judgment.
28

24

Alexander Hamilton refuted such an argument long ago:
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce
legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from
an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary
to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the
acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may
be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the
American constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests
cannot be unacceptable ....
. . . The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province
of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges,
as a fundamental law . It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning,
as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to
be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to
the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the
people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in
the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than
the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws,
rather than by those which are not fundamental. ...
. . . [A]ccordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the
latter and disregard the former.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 400-01 (Alexander Hamilton) (William R. Brock ed., 1996).
The State's argument proceeds from a false premise, namely, that the court has
somehow exalted the common law over legislation. The court's interpretation of article I,
section 11 does not constitutionalize the common law. See supra pt. V.B. Instead, it
gives meaning to the constitution's guarantee of a "remedy by due course of law" for an
25

injury done to one's "person, property or reputation." Exalting either legislation or the
common law "over a clear constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional
government." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622,634 (Utah 1990). Under
the separation of powers doctrine, the court is the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality
oflegislation. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at Ill, 1 Cranch at 177-78. In
exercising its constitutional power to review legislation that is claimed to violate the
constitution, the court is not acting as ''the critic of the legislature, but rather, the guardian
of the Constitution." Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251,256
(Kan. 1988) (citation omitted), disapproved of on other grounds by Bair v. Peck, 811 P .2d
1176, 1191 (Kan. 1991). By enforcing constitutional guarantees, the court does not
violate the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution, nor does it
impermissibly "trench upon the domain of the legislative department." Ritchie, 47 P. at
676 (Bartch, 1., concurring). "The power to declare what is the law is delegated to the
judicial department, and therefore the courts have the unquestioned right to declare any
act of the government, in any of the departments, which violates the constitution, to be
utterly void." Id. at 675-76.
The State's position, on the other hand, ''would virtually write article I, section 11
out of the Utah Constitution," Laney, 2002 UT 79,

~

29 (Durham, C.J.), ''would deny

citizens of this state the constitutional right secured by the Framers to a remedy by due
course of law for an injury to their persons, property, or reputations" and would frustrate

26

''the Framers' very purpose and intent in adopting the remedy clause in the Utah
Declaration of Rights," Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~ 32 (Stewart, J., concurring).
[T]he basic purpose of Article I, section 11 is to impose some limitation on
[the legislature'S power to create new, and abrogate old, rules oflaw] for
the benefit of those persons who are injured in their persons, property, or
reputations since they are generally isolated in society, belong to no
identifiable group, and rarely are able to rally the political process to their
aid.
Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 191 (quoting Berry, 717 P.2d at 676).

D.

The Damage Cap Fails the Berry Test.

Dr. Drezga reluctantly recognizes Berry as stating the test for determining whether
a statute violates article I, section 11, but urges the court to adopt a "classwide, deferential
analytical approach" to Berry because the legislature is in the best position to balance
detriments and benefits to the class affected by the legislation and can expand or contract
tort rights "for larger public purposes." (Br. of Aplee at 25.)29 However, the legislature is

Dr. Drezga cites Masich, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (1948), for the
proposition that the court should consider the impact of the legislation on the class
affected by the act and that the class affected by the act is the public at large. Masich did
not consider the effect of the statute involved there (the Occupational Disease Act) on the
public at large but on those directly affected by the legislation--the class of affected
workers. See 191 P.2d at 624. The public is always affected, however indirectly, by any
legislation. The damage cap does not directly affect the public at large but only those
victims of medical malpractice. The statute involved in Masich provided benefits to the
affected class, by doing away with the employer's common-law defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant doctrine. See id. The damage cap
and the medical malpractice act as a whole provide no benefits to the victinlS of medical
malpractice but only deprive them of benefits they previously enjoyed. In any event, this
court has rejected the argument that Berry is inconsistent with Masich. See Laney, 2002
29

27

also in the best position to be influenced by special interests and to sacrifice the rights of
the defenseless to the interests of the powerful and the influential. See supra note 13.
The purpose of a constitution, and particularly of a bill or declaration of rights, is to
protect certain rights of minorities from infringement by the majority. As Justice
Zimmerman recognized:
[T]he very act of drafting a constitution such as ours, which does not
bestow unlimited power on the legislature and which does reserve certain
rights to the people, constitutes a recognition that there must be some limits
on the legislature, that some interests of the people deserve special
protection in the maelstrom of interest group politics that is the legislative
process. Among the interests to which the Utah Constitution's drafters
assigned a degree of sanctity are those mentioned in article I, section 11.
To accord these rights the respect the drafters intended requires that
we approach challenges to legislation alleged to infringe article I, section 11
differently than we otherwise view claims of unconstitutionality that are
directed at ordinary economic legislation. . .. [I]n weighing the proffers of
the legislation's defenders, we should not use as our analytical model the
permissive and perfunctory standard of reasonable relation. . .. Instead, we
should give the legislation and its justifications careful scrutiny to assure
that redress of legally cognizable injuries is not unreasonably impaired.
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Where, as

here, the legislature decides to confer a benefit on the rich and powerful insurance
industry at the expense of brain-injured children, something more than deferential review
is required. See Berry, 717 P.2d at 678-69 (the court is "not at liberty to eviscerate a

UT 79, ~ 43 (Durham, C.J.); Craftsman, 1999 UT 18, ~~ 64, 83-90 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Moreover, even if it were inconsistent (and it is not), Berry and Laney, as
the court's more recent pronouncements on the subject, should control over Masich, a
decision over haIfa century old. See, e.g., Purtell v. Tehan, 139 N.W.2d 655,658 (Wis.
1966).
28

mandatory provision of our Declaration of Rights" by resorting merely to legislative
prerogative; that kind of analysis ''would result in the legislative power prevailing in
every case, and would deprive the constitutional rights embraced in the remedies clause
of any meaningful content or force").
1.

Neither the Cap nor the Malpractice Act as a Whole Provides
Any Alternative Remedy.

Dr. Drezga claims that the damage cap passes the fIrst prong of the Berry test
because the malpractice act as a whole provides an injured person "an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy." Dr. Drezga has not pointed to any provision of the act
that provides any alternative remedy to injured patients or to the public generally. The
act, as a whole, only restricts or eliminates remedies; it doesn't provide alternative
remedies. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-14-4 (shortening the statute oflimitations),
78-14-4.5 (reducing damages for amounts paid by collateral sources), 78-14-6 (requiring
a writing for any claim for breach of warranty, guarantee or contract), 78-14-7.1 (limiting
noneconomic damages), 78-14-8 & -12 to -14 (imposing procedural hurdles to bringing
an action), 78-14-9.5 (limiting awards of future damages). Only some kind of Orwellian
"newspeak" could fInd an effective and reasonable alternative remedy in a statute that
only limits or does away with existing rights and remedies.
The only provision of the act Dr. Drezga cites that is arguably of benefIt to the
public is section 78-14-9, which authorizes the insurance commissioner to provide for
professional liability insurance coverage through a joint underwriting program where

29

such coverage is not "readily available in the voluntary market." To the plaintiffs
knowledge, the insurance commissioner has never had to invoke section 78-14-9 and has
never even held hearings to determine whether malpractice insurance is not readily
available in any area of this state. In any event, this provision had existed for a decade
before the legislature eliminated an injured person's right to a remedy in excess of
$250,000 in noneconomic damages. When the legislature passed the damage cap, it only
eliminated a remedy--it did not provide an alternative remedy, much less an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy.
Dr. Drezga argues, however, that by continuing to make affordable, insured health
care available, the malpractice act satisfies Berry's first prong. But the act does not
require any doctor to carry any insurance, let alone sufficient insurance to guarantee a
recovery within the damage cap. Utah has always had affordable, insured health care,
both before and after passage of the act and passage of the cap.
[W]hen the legislature removes a particular right or remedy, it cannot
simply rely on other preexisting rights or remedies to fill the void left
behind, but must rather provide a quid pro quo in the form of either a
substitute remedy for the individual or the removal of a perceived social or
economic evil for society.
Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 192 (second italics added). The malpractice act and its damage

cap provide no quid pro quo or substitute remedy for Athan Montgomery. The right to
sue his doctor (who mayor may not have insurance) was a preexisting right.

30

Moreover, "access to a source of recovery is vastly different from the right to a
remedy." Kansas Malpractice Victims, 757 P.2d at 263. 30
"[T]o provide a remedy is not to guarantee a right, or indemnify against
wrong. Obviously, the extent of the assets of a judgment debtor are not
guaranteed by any Constitution. This argument evades the issue." ...
[T]he legislature cannot abolish the right to a remedy by capping a
plaintiffs recovery at $250,000, $1,000,000, or even $3,000,000 without
providing an adequate substitute remedy. The "substitute" they propose
here is nothing new in the law. [The damage cap] removes a substantial
right of the plaintiff and gives him nothing in return.

Id. at 263-64 (citations omitted).31 The same is true of the damage cap in this case.

2.

There Was No Clear Social or Economic Evil to Be Eliminated.

Dr. Drezga argues that, even if the act fails the fIrst prong of the Berry test the cap
still meets the Berry test because it eliminates a clear social and economic evil in a
reasonable manner by keeping the cost of medical malpractice insurance within the reach
of more doctors. To support this argument, the health-care amici inundate the court with
information

medical malpractice insurance crisis. The

vast majority of the material (some 80%) deals with conditions in other states--not in

",
The court in Kansas Malpractice Victims held that Kansas's caps of
$1,000,000 for total damages and $250,000 for noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases violated a malpractice victim's constitutional right to a remedy under
the Kansas Constitution. 757 P.2d at 264.
31
The court further noted that the continued availability of affordable health
care is a questionable benefIt to malpractice victims because, but for the malpractice they
might not need the continuing health care. 757 P.2d at 263.
31

Utah--and with current conditions, not conditions in 1986.32 Of the over 250 pages of
materials the amici have submitted, none was before the legislature in 1986 when it
passed the cap; it all post-dates the cap.
The burden was on Dr. Drezga to show that the alleged medical malpractice
insurance crisis of the mid 1980s was a "clear social or economic evil, " Berry, 717 P.2d
at 680 (emphasis added), and he has not shown either that it was clear or that it was an
evil. A problem is not necessarily the same as an "evil," and to proclaim it is not to make
it "clear." At best, the evidence shows that doctors had to pay more for liability insurance
in 1986 than they had previously paid. However, a problem for one sector of the
economy is not the same as a clear social or economic evil, particularly where the
problem is largely of the industry's own making. 33 Cf Rob M. Alston, Comment, Utah's
32
For critiques of the most recent wave oftort reform propaganda, see, e.g.,
Daniel J. Capra, 'An Accident and a Dream ': Problems with the Latest Attack on the
Civil Justice System, 20 PACE L. REv. 339 (2000); Merritt & Barry, supra note 11;
Statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy in Opp'n to the Med. Malpractice Amend., July
26,2002 (addendum at 8-14); Testimony of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer
Fed'n of Am., Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, July 17,2002 (addendum at 24-38).

As this court recognized in Lee, "a significant cause of dramatically
increased malpractice insurance premiums [is] the cyclical pricing and investment
practices of insurance companies." 867 P.2d at 588. When the economy is good,
insurance companies set artificially low rates to attract business so that the premiums can
be invested for high returns. When the economy turns sour, premiums are insufficient to
cover losses, and insurers raise their premiums dramatically. See id. at 588-89 (citation
omitted). See also, e.g., Capra, supra note 32, at 376 ("the evidence now indicates that
the insurance crisis [of the 1980s] was caused not by lawsuits, but rather by a cyclical
downturn combined with questionable underwriting practices and a drop in interest
rates"); Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber,
42 STAN. L. REv. 539, 567-68 (1990) (book review) ("The insurance industry did
33

32

Statute of Limitations Barring Minors from Bringing Medical Malpractice Actions:
Riding Roughshod over the Rights of Minors? 1992 UTAH L. REv. 929, 967 (it is ironic
that ''the growing number of persons willing to bring claims

mJ

const!

Iy

right--should be viewed as an evil to be eliminated").
The primary cause of the alleged medical malpractice crisis is medical
malpractice. 34 E.g., Alston, supra, at 967 (footnote omitted). If there is an eviL it is "the

experience a profit crunch during the years 1981-1983 but, as industry studies themselves
acknowledge, this crunch was not the result of expanded tort liability") (citing NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS AND INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, 1985: A
CRITICAL YEAR 30 (1985)); Eliot M. Blake, Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering
the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401,
411-12 (1988) (accord). The same is true of the current crisis. See, e.g., Rachel
Zimmerman & Christopher Oster, Insurers' Missteps Helped Provoke Malpractice
'Crisis, ' WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Al (see addendum at 39-43); Todd Sloane, Back
on the Tort Reform Merry-Go-Round, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 15,2002 (addendum
at 44); Testimony of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer Fed'n of Am., Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, July 17,2002
(addendum at 25-31). In fact, the insurance cycle affects all insurance markets. See, e.g.,
Remarks of Sen. Finlinson, Utah Senate, Jan. 24, 1986 (audograph disc #23) (the
availability of liability insurance is an industry-wide problem); Christopher Oster,
Workers' Comp Insurers Shy from Business in Big Cities, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, July 22,
2002 (premiums in nearly all insurance lines have increased by an average 10 to 50
percent). For 1985, the year before the damage cap was passed, the loss ratio for medical
malpractice insurance in Utah (86) was only slightly higher than the loss ratio for all lines
of insurance in Utah (75). UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, REpORT TO NORMAN H.
BANGERTER ... : BUSINESS OF 1985, at 18 (addendum at 4). Significantly, it is only the
malpractice insurance industry that has secured special treatment from the legislature.
34
Studies show that about 1% of hospital patients are injured by negligent
medical care each year. See, e.g., Eric 1. Thomas et aI., Incidence and Types ofAdverse
Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 264-65 (2000);
PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL IN.nJRY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 43 (1993). See also PATRICIA M. DANZON,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1985) (based on a
California study of hospital records, an estimated 260,000 injuries nationwide occur each
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large number of malpractice victims that receive no compensation under the current tort
system." Id. at 966. 35 That is because the number of patients injured by medical
malpractice greatly exceeds the number who ever file a claim. 36 As one expert concluded:
The visible costs of the malpractice system--insurance premiums,
defensive practices--are small compared with the less visible but far larger
costs of malpractice--the injuries that occur because of medical negligence.

year as a result of negligent health care). A Harvard study estimated that over 150,000
people die each year from medical malpractice. WEILER, supra, at 55. "Medical injury,
then, accounts for more deaths than all other types of accidents combined, and dwarfs the
mortality rates associated with motor vehicle accidents (50,000 deaths per year) and
occupation-related mishaps (6,000 deaths per year)." Id. (footnote omitted). Based on a
study of patients discharged from Utah and Colorado hospitals, one team of researchers
recently concluded that health-care caused injury "continues to be a significant public
health problem." Thomas, supra, at 61.

Cf Wry v. Dial, 503 P.2d 979, 991 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) ("If anything is to
be considered 'socially unacceptable' it would be for an individual [wrongfully] injured
by another to receive less for pain and suffering than that amount to which he is
entitled").
35

Less than one victim of malpractice in seven ever asserts a claim. WEILER,
supra note 34, at 70. See also David M. Studdert et aI., Negligent Care and Malpractice
Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 250 (2000) (in a study of
Utah and Colorado patients who suffered negligent injury, 97% did not sue); A. Russell
Localio et aI., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 250 (1991) (concluding that "the civil-justice
system only infrequently compensates injured patients"). A Utah Department of Health
study determined that, from 1995 to 1999,4,248 patients at Utah hospitals had a
"misadventure of surgical and medical care," meaning that the adverse event was the
result of an error. Utah Department of Health, Adverse Events Related to Medical Care,
Utah: 1995-99 iii (June 2001) (addendum at 48). Another study determined that the
adverse effects of medical treatment accounted for 4.7% of all injury- and poisoningrelated emergency department visits in 1997, or over 26,000 visits. Norma Wagner,
Medical Mistakes Make Life Busier for E.R., SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 21, 2000, at AI, A6
(addendum at 50). Yet UMIA, the largest medical malpractice insurer in the state, only
reported a total of 3,263 claims for the ten-year period 1991-2000. UMIA Newsletter, 1st
Quarter, 2001 (addendum at 51).
36

34

· .. A rough estimate of the cost of these injuries is $24 billion, or ten times
the cost of malpractice insurance premiums.
Patricia M. Danzon, The Medical Malpractice System: Facts and Reforms, in
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE EFFECTS OF LITIGATION ON HEALTH CARE COSTS

28,30

(Mary Ann Baily & Warren I. Cikins eds., 1985) (footnote omitted).
)~

The Cap Is an Arbitrary and Unreasonable Means of Achieving
Its Objective.
the insurance industry were cOIlsidered a clear

Even if

social or economic evil, the damage cap is an arbitrary and unreasonable means of
remedying the problem. It is as irrational as the legislature trying to reduce the effects of
crime on society

denying crime victims compensation

their

0

uries. As tIm Cllurt

stated in Sun Valley: "[W]e do not believe that abrogation of an individual's section 11
constitutional right is a reasonable way to provide for an industry's peace of mind. We
simply cannot justify a policy favoring [a defendant's] economic interest in avoiding
liability over a plaintiffs economic interest in recovering damages." 782 P.2d at 193.
Not only have Dr. Drezga and the amici failed to show that health care from
insured providers was threatened or unavailable in Utah in 1986, when the legislature
enacted the cap, but they have also failed to show that taking away the rights of victims is
a reasonable means of solving the alleged problem. And in fact it is not, for at least two
reasons.
First

the evidence shows that the entire cost of the malpractice legal system

(plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, pre litigation proceedings, pretrial discovery and
35

proceedings, trial or settlement) is less than 1% of the total health-care dollar. See, e.g.,

Lee, 867 P.2d at 587-88 (citations omitted). Thus, even if the legislature did entirely
away with a cause of action for medical malpractice, the cost of medical care would only
be reduced by about 1% at the most.
Second, a reduction in the severity of malpractice claims in Utah has little effect
on insurance premiums for Utah providers, since the cost of insurance in Utah is not
driven primarily by what happens in Utah. Utah is a small market. The majority of Utah
providers are insured by UMIA, and UMIA reinsures above certain limits.37 Because
UMIA must necessarily reinsure with national companies, reinsurance costs are
determined by national experience. Thus, whatever happens in Utah has little effect on
malpractice premiums here. And because "it is highly unlikely that lower insurance rates
are inextricably tied to the existence of' the damage cap, cf Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 193,
the cap cannot meet the second prong of the Berry test.
This court in Laney rejected the argument that a statute passed "in the 'hope that
passage ... will make it easier or cheaper for a government entity to obtain liability
insurance'" met the second prong of the Berry test. 2002 UT 79,

~

66 (citation omitted).

The court noted that, while ''that objective is worthy," the "general nature of the

Reinsurance is "[i]nsurance of all or part of one insurer's risk by a second
insurer, who accepts the risk in exchange for a percentage of the original premium."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (7th ed. 1999). In 1991 and 1992, for example, UMIA
had two reinsurance treaties. One insured losses over $300,000 (plus an indexed amount)
up to $1,000,000, and the other insured losses over $1,000,000. Utah Med. Ins. Ass 'n v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 1100, 1106 (1998).
37

36

legislative fmdings do not show that large damage awards have been made against
municipalities in connection with their operation of an electrical power system, or that
such operation has been affected in any way by potential
case.

Drezga and the amici

0

,

m

not shown that large damage awards against

physicians in Utah had adversely impacted either the availability of liability insurance or
the availability of health care. In fact, when the legislature passed the damage cap. there
noneconomic damages in Utah of even $100,000, let alone

never been an

$250,000. Remarks of Sen. Barlow, Utah Senate, Jan. 23, 1986 (audograph disc #20).
Because ''the dramatic increases in medical malpractice insurance premiums and
the increased costs

health care were

significant increases in malpractice

ITH)l

lawsuits or claims in Utah, ... or by significant increases in the size of jury verdicts," the
legislative means for solving the insurance problem by depriving injured patients of their
right to full recovery "simply does not

the legislative objecti\eo" Lee, 867 P.'

588. "It is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the
medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and
therefore most in need

compensation." Carson

t'

l\I(lUrer.

1980).
Whatever slight benefit damage caps have in increasing the affordability of
liability insurance and even slighter benefit .

the rapid rise in the cost

care. are more than offset by the harm they cause to the catastrophically injured, like
Athan Montgomery, and the harm they cause to society, by deflecting attention away
37

;Jt

from the real cause of any alleged medical malpractice crisis. See, e.g., Randall R.
Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U.
CIN. L. REv. 53, 63 (1998) ("On their face," damage caps "do little or nothing to improve

deterrence, compensation, and fairness in the administration of justice") (footnote
omitted). They do nothing to address the problem of "the large number of uncovered
medical injuries." Id. Moreover, they are "counterproductive in tenus of public safety"
since they provide health-care providers ''with less incentive to take adequate
precautions." Sun Valley, 782 P .2d at 193. "[The] economic function [of liability for
negligence] ... is to deter uneconomical accidents," which "is produced by compelling
negligent injurers to make good the victim's losses." Id. n.46 (quoting R. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law § 6.12, at 143 (1972)). See also Komesar, supra, at 59 ("Any

determination of the desirable level of prevention that ignored nonpecuniary losses would
grossly underestimate the desire for prevention").
In short,

the legislation's supporters have not carried their burden of proof.... [T]he
justifications advanced for the legislature's severe abridgement of the right
of this narrow category of potential plaintiffs to bring their actions for
actual injuries suffered are speculative, to put it charitably. The defenders
of this legislation certainly have not shown that the effective elimination of
the minor's legal right to sue for medical malpractice [or, as in this case, for
noneconomic injuries greater than $250,000] is a reasonable, nonarbitrary
means for lowering medical malpractice premiums in Utah. Absent such a
showing, they have failed to rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality
that attaches to legislation that so severely limits a common law right of
action protected by article I, section 11.
Lee, 867 P.2d at 592 (Zimmerman, 1., concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.).
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VI.

THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES THE UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE
LAWS.
As this court recently explained, article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, the
'''the same general princip]e 0" as the

operation of ~lhe

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
namely, that persons similarly situated should not be treated differently, but article I,
section

"'establishes different requirements

the

Protection Clause'"

that are '''at least as exacting and, in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard
applied under the federal constitution. '" Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ,-r,-r 31, 33, 455
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (citations omitted).38 A statute that "implicates a 'fundamental or
critical right' or creates classifications which are 'considered impermissible or suspect in
the abstract'" is analyzed under "a heightened degree of scrutiny." Gallivan, 2002 UT

89, '140 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
The damage cap implicates fundamental or

namely. the

constitutional rights to a remedy and to a jury trial. It also creates impermissible or

For that reason, Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), which applied a federal equal-protection analysis to the
Price-Anderson Act's $560 million damage cap on liability for nuclear accidents resulting
from the operation of a federally-licensed private nuclear power plant, is not controlling
on this point. Duke Power also did not involve a constitutional right to a remedy. The
case is also distinguishable because the statute that capped damages also did away with
defenses, allowing recovery without proof of fault; furthermore, the statute provided a
fund for recovery, and Congress further agreed to ''take whatever action is deemed
necessary ... to protect the public from the consequences of' a nuclear accident. See 438
U.S. at 90-92. Here, the damage cap does not guarantee a malpractice victim any
recovery.
38
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suspect classifications, including classifications between the victims of medical
malpractice and of other torts and between malpractice victims who suffer serious
noneconomic injuries and those who do not. "[F]or a discriminatory classification to be
constitutional it must be reasonably necessary to further, and in fact must actually and
substantially further, a legitimate legislative purpose." Id.

~

42 (citation omitted).

Dr. Drezga argues that the damage cap does not violate article I, section 24
because the classifications the cap makes are not discriminatory. He argues that there are
legitimate differences between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims because
of the ''high and unpredictable exposure to soft damages awards in the medical
malpractice area." (Br. of Aplee at 35.) The distinction between so-called soft and hard
damages does not apply in this case because all of Athan Montgomery's damages meet
Dr. Drezga's defmition of "hard"; that is, their existence has been determined, and they
have been measured. (See supra pt. II.) Moreover, there is no evidence that medical
malpractice victims are exposed to greater "soft" damages than other tort victims. The
amount of pain and suffering one suffers is determined by the nature of the person's
injuries and his or her pain threshold and not by the identity of the tortfeasor.39
Dr. Drezga also argues that the distinction between victims of medical malpractice
and other tort victims is a straw man because everyone is a potential victim of medical

39
If medical malpractice victims suffer greater noneconomic damages than
other tort victims, that does not justify the discrimination against them but only makes it
worse, by making it more likely that they will not be fully compensated for their injuries.
40

malpractice. But the statute does not cap the damages of potential victims because they
have no damages to cap. It only caps the damages of actual victims of medical
malpractice and not even all ofthem--only those who have actually suffered nonecollOlnic
damages greater

$250,000.

By Dr. Drezga's reasoning, the court's most recent article I, section 24 decision
was wrong. In Gallivan, the court concluded that the statute at issue there impermissibly
of registered voters--those who reside in urban counties.

a

2002 UI 89, ~~ 44-49. Since every registered voter is potentially an urban resident,
under Dr. Drezga's argument, the statute could not violate the uniform operation of the
laws.
By Dr. Drezga's reasoning, a statute that imposed restrictions on, say, Democrats
but not Republicans would also raise no article I, section 24 concern because everyone
could potentially' .

avoid the statute's restrictions.

Republican

tact,

such a statute, like the statute struck down in Gallivan, would raise less of an equal
protection issue than the damage cap because people could avoid the restriction merely by
choosing to change parties or moving from the

to

, \\hereas victims

medical malpractice do not choose their status any more than one chooses his or her race
or gender.
Even if the class is all potential victims of medical malpractice, the cap still
violates article I, section 24, since that section "protects against discrimination within a
class," Gallivan, 2002 UI 89,

~

38, and within the class of potential victims, only those
41

with noneconomic damages greater than $250,000 have their recoveries artificially
limited. In short, even by Dr. Drezga's reasoning the statute does not operate uniformly
on all persons similarly situated. See id.
Dr. Drezga argues that the statute does not discriminate against the most severely
injured because the plaintiffs have not shown a correlation between the severity of the
injury and high noneconomic damages. Both courts and the insurance industry itself have
historically considered the amount of the plaintiff s special damages as an indication of
the value of his or her pain and suffering. See, e.g., Goertz v. Chicago & N. W Ry. Co.,
153 N.E.2d 486,494 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958) (Kiley, J., concurring); H. LAURENCE Ross,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS
239 (1970) ("The calculation of general damages is for the most part a matter of
multiplying the medical bills by a tacitly but generally accepted arbitrary constant"). In
any event, the plaintiff does not have to establish such a correlation empirically because,
by definition, plaintiffs who suffer noneconomic damages greater than $250,000 are more
severely injured (at least noneconomic ally) than those whose noneconomic damages are
less than $250,000.
Finally, for the reasons stated in point V.D, supra, the damage cap is not
"reasonably necessary to further, and in fact [does not] actually and substantially further,
a legitimate legislative purpose." See Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ~ 42.
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VII.

THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL.
Dr. Drezga claims that the plaintiffs' argument that the cap violates the

constitutional right to a jury trial under article I, section lOis not only without support in
but contrary to Utah law. (Br. of Aplee at 39-41.to McCorvey v. Utah State Department
o/Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), and Parks v. Utah Transit Authority, 2002
UT 55, the two cases Dr. Drezga cites for his argument, are distinguishable from this
case. 41 Both involved the Governmental Immunity Act cap as applied to governmental
entities performing governmental functions. Because there was no right to recover for
injuries arising out of such activities at common law, the statute that created a limited
right to recover did not impinge on any fundamental right and did not violate the
constitution because, in creating a right, the legislature can also put limits on it. See
McCorvey, 868 P.2d at 47-48.
Dr. Drezga overstates the plaintiffs' argument when he says that the
plaintiffs appear to argue that the constitutional right to a jury trial is a right to have
damages determined exclusively by the jury "without any oversight by a court, other than
the possibility of a remittitur coupled with an opportunity for a new trial." (Br. of Aplee
at 39.) In fact, the court exercises great control over the jury's determination of damages,
by determining what evidence the jury hears and the instructions given to the jury, as well
as by its power to review the jury's verdict. The jury's verdict is also subject to appellate
review. The appellate court can reverse if the jury's damage award is not supported by
the evidence or is excessive and influenced by passion or prejudice. These are all judicial
functions that provide sufficient oversight to prevent the type of irrational and
unsupported jury verdicts Dr. Drezga fears. See Vidmar, supra page 12, at 898
(concluding that the judicial system's "corrective mechanisms for wayward jury verdicts"
are effective in controlling the rare "outlier" award).
40

Moreover, neither specifically analyzed article I, section 10. See Parks,
2002 UT 55, ~ 18; McCorvey, 868 P.2d at 46-48.
41
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Dr. Drezga acknowledges that "logic seems to require, that the right of the jury to
detennine damages without interference ... is absolute." (Br. of Aplee at 39-40.) He
argues, however, that the only Utah authority the plaintiffs cite--Justice Durham's
separate opinion in Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 365-66--"does not take this logical absolutist
approach." (Br. of Aplee at 40.) He ignores Justice Durham's clear statement: "I believe
that the Utah state constitutional right to jury trial on the question of civil damages is
absolute." 775 P.2d at 366. 42
Dr. Drezga also claims that, under Justice Durham's Condemarin analysis, the cap
would be upheld because it is "significantly higher than" the cap in Condemarin, applies
only to soft damages and is amply justified. In fact, when the $100,000 cap struck down
in Condemarin was passed in 1965, it was relatively higher than the $250,000 medical
malpractice cap when it was passed in 1986. 43 As for Dr. Drezga's arguments regarding
soft versus hard damages and justification for the cap, see points I, II and V.D, supra.
Dr. Drezga and the health-care amici suggest that the cap does not violate the
constitutional right to a jury trial because the jury's role is to detennine the facts, and it is

Justice Durham went on to say that, "[u]nder the due process balancing
approach," she ''would not hold any limitation in actions against the government was per
se invalid because of the infringement of the right to jury trial," 775 P.2d at 366 (fust
emphasis added), but she clearly believed that the damage cap in Condemarin violated the
constitutional right to a jury trial, id.
42

Based on the Consumer Price Index, $100,000 in 1965 dollars was worth
$347,936.51 in 1986 dollars.
43
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the legislature's role to determine the legal consequences of the jury's factual fmdings; a
cap merely sets the outer limits of the remedy, which is a matter of law.
Damages, however, are a question of fact, not law. Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001). Under Utah law, damages in

medical malpractice cases--even damages for "mental and physical suffering"--are for the
jury to decide: "While the law cannot measure with exactness such suffering and cannot
determine with absolute certainty what damages, if any, plaintiff may be entitled to, still
those are questions which a jury under proper instructions from the court must
determine." Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307,64 P.2d 208,213 (1937) (emphasis added).
See also Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) ("if a

party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of ... damages ... in order
'to preserve "the substance of the common law right of trial by jury''''') (citation omitted).
As this court has indicated "numerous times ... , the right of trial by jury is one which
should be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party ha[ s] demanded such a
trial, he is entitled to have the benefit ofthejury'sfindings on issues offact . ... " Mel
Hardman Prods., Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913,917 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added).

Dr. Drezga argues that the Supreme Court's holding in Cooper Industries supports
his argument that the right to a jury trial is not violated when a court reduces a damage
award to an amount the legislature has set. Cooper did not involve any statute and thus is
inapplicable. Nevertheless, its reasoning supports the plaintiffs' position. The issue in
Cooper was the standard of review an appellate court was to apply in considering the
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constitutionality of a punitive damage award. 532 U.S. at 426. The Court held that de
novo review was required. Id. at 436. In doing so, the Court distinguished between
punitive and compensatory damages: '''Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered,
which presents a question of historical or predictive fact, the level of punitive damages is
not really a "fact" "tried" by the jury.'" Id. at 437 (emphasis added and citations
omitted). See also id. at 432 ("A jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff s injury is
essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an
expression of its moral condemnation"). Therefore, appellate review of a lower court's
determination that an award of punitive damages is consistent with due process "does not
implicate" the constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. (footnote omitted). Altering a jury's
award of compensatory damages, on the other hand, does impinge on a jury's factual
fmding and hence on the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Kansas Malpractice Victims
Coalition v. Bell, 757 P .2d 251, 258 (Kan. 1988) ("When the trial judge enters judgment
for less than the jury verdict ... he clearly invades the province of the jury. This is an
infringement on the jury's determination of the facts, and, thus, is an infringement on the
right to ajury trial. '') (emphasis added).44 To argue that a statute that fIxes noneconomic
damages without regard to the jury's factual determination does not infringe on the
constitutional right to a jury trial is not only "illogical," 757 P.2d at 258, but also pure

The trial court's power to order a remittitur does not violate the
constitutional right to a jury trial because the plaintiff retains the option to have a second
jury determine his or her damages. See infra note 45.
44
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sophistry. The "constitutional protection cannot be evaded by the semantic argument"
that the jury's factual fmding is not ignored but only limited. Cf Berry, 717 P.2d at 679.
To argue that the right to a jury trial is not violated when the jury's factual detennination
goes unheeded "pays lip service to the fonn of the jury but robs the institution of its
function." Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463,473 (Or. 1999) (quoting Sofie v.

Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 721, amended, 780 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1989». The court
should "not construe constitutional rights in such a manner." fd. (quoting Sofie, 771 P.2d
at 721). See also Berry, 717 P .2d at 678 ("We are simply not at liberty to eviscerate a
mandatory provision of our Declaration of Rights ... "). Otherwise, the legislature could
fmd the facts in every case and deprive all of the jury's factual fmdings of their legal
effect.
Dr. Drezga's article I, section 10 argument is particularly ironic in light of his
other arguments. He criticizes the unelected judiciary for what he sees as invading the
province of the legislature, the people's representatives. Yet he is only too willing to
allow the legislature to override a jury--''the purest democratic institution we have."
David C. Vladeck, Defending Courts: A Brief Rejoinder to Professors Fried and

Rosenberg, 31

SETON

HALL L. REv. 631,641 (2001). This is not a case of a court acting

as a super-legislature but of the legislature overstepping its bounds and acting as a superjury. See Robert S. Peck, In Defense of Fundamental Principles: The Unconstitutionality

of Tort Reform, 31

SETON

HALL L. REv. 672, 676 (2001).
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VIII. THE PLAINTIFFS PRESERVED THEIR DUE PROCESS AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS ARGUMENTS.
Dr. Drezga urges this court to disregard the plaintiffs' due process and separation
of powers arguments because, he claims, they were not preserved below. As Dr. Drezga
notes, to sufficiently preserve an issue for appeal, the trial court must have an opportunity
to rule on the issue. The trial court has that opportunity if the issue is "specifically
raised" in "a timely fashion," and the party introduces "supporting evidence or relevant
legal authority." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844,847 (Utah 1998)
(emphasis added and citations omitted).
Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not brief their due process and separation of powers
arguments in the trial court. However, there is no requirement that an issue be briefed to
be preserved. At oral argument, the plaintiffs argued that the damage cap should be
reviewed with heightened scrutiny because it violated due process (R. 810, at 20, 26, 45)
and separation of powers (R. 810, at 43,45), among other things. At oral argument,
plaintiffs' counsel also gave the trial court a copy of Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689
N .E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (see R. 810, at 21, 44), an Illinois case cited in the plaintiffs'
memorandum (R. 472) that held that Illinois's cap on noneconomic damages violated the
separation of powers doctrine. In ruling on the motion, the trial court indicated that it had
considered both the briefs of the parties and the oral argument. (R. 785.) Thus, the
plaintiffs specifically raised the due process and separation of powers issues in a timely
fashion and supported them with relevant legal authority.
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IX.

THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES DUE PROCESS.
Dr. Drezga argues that, because there is no fundamental right to unlimited

noneconomic damages, the court should defer to the legislature's conclusion that there is
a rational basis for the damage cap and that the cap therefore does not violate the right to
due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Regardless of whether there is a "fundamental" right to recover unlimited
noneconomic damages, the right to recover for negligently caused personal injuries is "an
'important substantive right,'" Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 354 (per Durham, J.) (quoting
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980», and "a substantial property right, not
only of monetary value but in many cases [such as this one] fundamental to the injured
person's physical well-being and ability to continue to live a decent life," Hunter v. North
Mason High Sch., 539 P.2d 845,848 (Wash. 1975). See also Horton v. Goldminer's
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989) ("Certainly, the right to the protection of the
law for one's person [and] property ... is a right that is as essential to the happiness of an
individual as is liberty"); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 373 (per Stewart, 1.) ("Whether or not
the right involved here is thought to be 'fundamental,' ... it is certainly an important
right that ought not to be discriminatorily abrogated or diminished unless there is a strong
countervailing public interest"). Moreover, the damage cap infringes on Athan
Montgomery's constitutional right to a remedy under article I, section 11, his right to the
uniform operation of the laws under article I, section 24, and his right to a jury trial under
article I, section 10. All are certainly important, if not fundamental rights. Heightened
49

scrutiny is therefore required. Hipwell ex reI. Jensen v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987, 988-89 nA
(Utah 1993).
Because Dr. Drezga has not shown that the damage cap was necessary for the
continued availability of medical malpractice insurance in Utah, much less for the
continued availability of insured health care, and because the cap can have only the
slightest impact, if any, on the cost of health care in Utah, the damage cap is not
"'narrowly tailored'" to achieve "a compelling state interest"; it therefore violates due
process. See Wells v. Children's Aid Soc 'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984)
(citation omitted) (stating the test for due process where heightened scrutiny is required).

x.

THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS
DOCTRINE.
Dr. Drezga argues that the cap does not violate the separation of powers provision

of the Utah Constitution, article V, section 1, because the legislature has the power to
determine what the substantive law of Utah should be.
The amount of damages, however, is a question of fact, not law. See, e.g., Cooper
Indus., 532 U.S. at 432 (2001). Juries determine the facts in a medical malpractice case,
see, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307,64 P.2d 208,213 (1937), and juries are an arm of
the judicial branch, not the legislative, e.g., Bell v. State, 381 P.2d 167, 173 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1962). A cap on damages contravenes the traditional authority of the judicial
branch to assess, case by case, whether a damage award is excessive. See Best v. Taylor
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Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1080 (Ill. 1997). It "directly changes the outcome ofa
jury determination" by "taking a jury's fmding of fact and altering it to conform to a
predetermined formula." Sofie, 771 P.2d at 720. It is a judge who is empowered to draw
the legal conclusion that a jury award is excessive based on the evidence in the case.
Because the legislature "cannot make such case-by-case determinations," the legislature'S
attempt to do so violates the separation of powers. See id. at 721; Best, 689 N .E.2d at

CONCLUSION
Constitutions were created to protect and preserve certain critical rights of
individuals in the face of changing political winds. See, e.g., West Va. Bd. ofEduc. v.

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087,
1091 (Utah 1989). The courts "are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 402
(Alexander Hamilton) (William R. Brock ed., 1996). "[I]t is not to be inferred ... that the
representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a

The judicial branch may order a remittitur of a jury verdict. See Best, 689
N .E.2d at 1079 ("For over a century it has been a traditional and inherent power of the
judicial branch of government to apply the doctrine of remittitur, in appropriate and
limited circumstances, to correct excessive jury verdicts"). The legislature, however, may
not. Sofie, 771 P .2d at 720-21. A judicial remittitur preserves the right to a jury trial
because, if the plaintiff does not accept the remittitur, he is entitled to have his case heard
by another jury. The damage cap does not preserve that right. See Lakin, 987 P.2d at
472.
45
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majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing
constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions .... "

Id. What Justice Moffat said in another time and context applies equally today:

It is an easy method to avoid the plain terms of the State Constitution. If
constitutional limitations may thus by a process of defmition be eliminated,
evaded, or evaporated out of the Constitution, the stabilizing purposes and
restraints of Constitutions intended to tide the people over periods of
emergency, excitement, or trouble until calm reflection may analyze and
measure the needs will cease to accomplish the purposes for which they are
intended. Constitutions are drawn during sober hours, upon careful and
painstaking consideration. It is beside the question to say the framers of the
Constitution did not anticipate [an alleged medical malpractice insurance
crisis, for example]. It is certain, however, that the framers of the
Constitution and the people who adopted it intended that certain ... policies
and limitations should be maintained.

Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237,48 P.2d 530,553-54 (1935) (Moffat, 1., dissenting).
The Utah Constitution guarantees injured persons a right to a remedy, the right to
the uniform operation of the laws, the right to a jury trial and the right to due process.
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than
through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this,
all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton). To allow the legislature to
eliminate or evade these rights by defming them out of the constitution because of an
alleged crisis that did not in fact exist in Utah violates both the spirit and the letter of the
constitution.
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Admittedly, "it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to
do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution where legislative invasions of it had
been instigated by the major voice of the community." Id. at 402-03. Nevertheless, for
the foregomg reasons and those stated m the pJamtiffs' opening brief, the court should
reverse the trial court's decision to limit the amount of the judgment, vacate the amended
judgment and reinstate the original judgment.
DATED this 1st day of November, 2002.
P, KJNG & OLSEN

Paul M. Simmons

(Original signature)
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1988
1

ALL O:rm:R LINES:
FINANCIAL GUARANTY
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
EARTHOUAKE
WORKERS' COMPENSTAl'ION
OTHER LIABILTY
AIRCRAFT (ALL PERILS)
FIDELITY
SURETY
GLASS
BURGLARY AND THEFT
BOILER AND MACHINERY
CREDIT
TOTAL ALL OTHER LINES:

TABLE C
1988 SUMMARY OF UTAH OPERATIONS

OF ALL INSURERS BY LINE OF INSURANCE
WRITTEN
PRfloIIUMS
LIFE INSURANCE:
OROINARY
CREDIT LIFE
GROUP
INDUSTRIAL
TOTAL LIFE INSURANCE:
ANNUITIES:

$279,657.184
15,554,555
54.734,607

FIRE AND ALLIED LINES:
FIRE
ALLIED LINES
OCEAN MARINE
INLAND MARINE
TOTAL FIRE " ALLIED LINES:
MULTIPLE PERIL:
FARMOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL
HOMEOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL
COMMERCIAL MULTIPLE PERIL
TOTAL MULTIPLE PERIL:
AUTOMOBILE:
PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO NO FAULT
OTHER PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO
COMMERCIAL AUTO NO FAULT
OTHER COMMERCIAL AUTO
PRIVATE PASS. PHYSICAL DAMAGE
COMM. AUTO PHYSICAL Dk~GE
TOTAL AUTOMOBILE:

$182.041.084
6,295.386
79,091.612

~J.l~l

1.l24.76~

349.989.499

268,822.846

352.302,899

111,541.939

PREMJ:UMS
EAllNED
ACCIDENT & HEALTH:
GROUP ACCIDENT & HEALTH
CREDIT A & H. (GROUP & IND.)
COLLECTIVELY RENEWABLE A " H
NON-CANCELLABLE A " H
GUARANTEED RENEWABLE A " H
NON-RENEWABLE - STATED REASONS
OTHER ACCIDENT ONLY
ALL OTHER A " H
TOTAL A " H:

BENEFITS
PAID

LOSSES
INCURRED
322.647.821
5.329,150
1,987.030
4.449.851
10,789.885
1.447,735
340.139

•••

350.314,406

105
39
61
55
47
59
44
67
96

14.342,296
7,407.412
1. 040,750
l2.2Ql.222
42.692,457

2.842.224
2.668.294
217,288
G,i12,4§§
13.947.272

20
36
2l
41
32

2.576,138
77,693,190
2Q,QQ2.'J§
170,278.564

1.652,688
49,505.288
'2.a11.7al
80.969.759

64
64
33
47

33.342.632
156.373.386
2.829,111
53.571.689
147.224.237

20.870.888
109.550,202
640.410
22.397.182
75.351.025

63
70
23
42
51
29
56

2~,7,Q,~17

7,~2,,1l~

419,061,572

236,362.122

l' 0 l'

AL

~.57l.l~G

169.9U.702

•••

.1.8&6.778.142

149.005
'.759.404
1.723
29.670.858
40.623,072
5,556,138
1,11'.614
5.362.791
8.695
41.918
308,726
a.lia Jll
95.GJ5.U6

'1.157.793,660

6
21
69
59
68
19
46
3
13
13
228
56

62

LOSS
RATIO

306,579,221
13.651,969
3,244,827
8.026.867
22.841.783
2.459.331
765,953
i.25l. 4 2G
362,521. 449

J.JZ~.72~

REP 0 R T

2.667.618
22.863.554
693.543
42.808.598
68,752.722
8.280,314
5,785,800
11,589,995
248,579
321,446
2,348,375

,.
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TABLE C
1985 SUMMARY OF UTAH OPERATIONS
OF ALL INSURERS BY LINE OF INSURANCE

BENEFITS
PAID

LI FE INSURANCE:
ORDINARY
CREDIT LIFE
GROUP
INDUSTRIAL
TOTAL LIFE INSURANCE:

WRITTEN
PREMIUHS
254,037,097
15,298,159
54,664,845
68,547
324,068,648

155,942,340
5,395,839
59,124,306
1,449,882
221,912,367

ANNUITIES:

175,754,897

75,616,425

PREHIUHS
EARNED

LOSSES
INCURRED

LOSS
RATIO

ACCIDENT & HEALTH:
GROUP ACCIDENT & HEALTH
CREDIT A & H, (GROUP & IND.)
COLLECTIVELY RENEWABLE A & H
NON-CANCELLABLE A & H
GUARANTEED RENEWABLE A & H
NON-RENEWABLE - STATED REASONS
OTHER ACCIDENT ONLY
ALL OTHER A & H
TOTAL A & H:

273,272,076
12,730,596
4,048,729
6,401,099
18,233,689
2,099,166
803,170
4,238,051
321,826,576

219,339,430
5,728,375
1,766,543
3,156,601
9,108,409
1,214,092
319,564
3,871,083
244,504,097

80
45
44
49
50
58
40
91
75

FIRE AND ALLIED LINES:
FIRE
ALLIED LINES
OCEAN MARINE
INLAND MARINE
TOTAL FIRE & ALLIED LINES:

10,628,277
5,122,386
869,030
16,710,290
33,329,983

33,010,899
3,238,257
588,948
46,700,663
83,538,767

311
63
68
279
250

HULTIPLE PERIL:
FARMOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL
HOMEOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL
COMMERCIAL MULTIPLE PERIL
TOTAL MULT~PLE PERIL:

2,524,833
62,137,091
63,461,291
128,123,215

1 ,560 ,311
39,600,960
67,817,976
108,979,247

62
64
107
85

AUTOK>BILE:
PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO NOFAULT
OTHER PRIVATE PASSENGER AUTO
COMMERCIAL AUTO NOFAULT
OTHER COMMERCIAL AUTO
PRIVATE PASS. PHYSICAL DAMAGE
COMM. AUTO PHYSICAL DAMAGE
TOTAL AUTOMOBILE:

19,574,330
101,552,356
1,655,927
38,892,696
113,609,632
25,150,686
300,435,627

13,966,359
88,833,772
256,834
33,307,059
70,608,984
12,666,440
219,639,448

71
87
16
86
62
50
73

ALL OTHER LINES:
MISCELLANEOUS
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
EARTHQUAKE
WORKERS' COMPENSTATION
OTHER LIABILTY
AIRCRAFT (ALL PERILS)
FIDELITY
SURETY
GLASS
BURGLARY AND THEFT
BOILER AND MACHINERY
CREDIT
TOTAL ALL OTHER LINES:

2,447,158

124

12,021,561
434,341
50,660,977
39,374,674
6,202,295
3,526,094
13,237,056
81,243
385,732
1,778,853
4,756,936
134,431,307

10,366,172
21,33438,018,504
38,143,767
5,823,204
2,285,023
14,668,220
21,126
64,080
225,960
6,247,953
118,289,833

86
575
97
94
65
111
26
17
13
131
87

••• REP 0 R T TOT A L •••

1,971,545

1,417 ,970,253

1.072.480.184
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H E 0 I CAL

RANK

HAL P RAe T ICE

NAME OF INSURER

1 UTAH MEDICAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
2 INSURANCE CORPORATION OF AMERICA
3 ST PAUL FIRE & MARINE INS CO
4 AMERICAN CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
5 AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY CO THE
6 PROFESSIONAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE
7 CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO
8 CHICAGO INSURANCE COMPANY
9 FREMONT INDEMNITY COMPANY
10 ST PAUL MERCURY INS CO. THE
11 PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO
12 NATIONAL CHIROPRACTIC MUTUAL INSRANCE CO
13 AMERICAN CASUALTY CO OF READING PA
14 NATIONAL FIRE INS CO OF HARTFORD
15 RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY
16 JEFFERSON INSURANCE CO OF N Y
17 TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE
18 INSURANCE CO OF THE STATE OF PENN
19 NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INS CO
20 INSURANCE CO OF NORTH AMERICA

TOTAL FOR TOP
TOT AL FOR ALL

20 RANKED INSURERS
42 INSURERS WRITING THIS LINE

W0 R K E R S

RANK

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

% OF
MARKET

PREMIUMS
WRITTEN

56.17
12.75
8.17
6.56
5.71
1.65
1.36
1.30
1.25
1.21
.72
.69
.44
.22
.20
.19

$ 6.327.289

.16
.16
.12

1.437.168
920.639
739.056
643.931
186.867
153.384
146.807
141.882
137.045
82.164
78,315
49.866
25,132
23.075
21.494
20,480
19.146
18,824
14,205

99.31
100.00

$ , 1,186,769
$ 11,263,510

.18

C 0 H PEN SAT I 0 H

NAME OF INSURER
INSURANCE CO OF NORTH AMERICA
WAUSAU UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY CO
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INS CO
EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU A MUTUAL CO
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS CO OF PITTS
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
BIRMINGHAM FIRE INS CO OF PA
STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CO THE
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CO
AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE CO
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO
ARGONAUT INSURANCE CO
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO THE
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO
HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY THE
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO
FIRE & CASUALTY INS CO OF CONN THE
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION

TOTAL FOR TOP 20 RANKED INSURERS
TOTAL FOR ALL 197 INSURERS WRITING THIS LINE

% OF
MARKET

PREMIUMS
WRITTEN

12.56
9.27
6.89
4.89
4.14
3.97
3.89
3.35
2.95
2.90
2.77
2.36
2.35
2.12
1.94
1. 78
1. 74
1.47
1.46
1.46

$ 5,859.093
4.324,007
3,213.197
2,281.343
1.932,721
1.854,854
1 ,814,841
1,563,925
1,377 .821
1.352.338
1.291.600
1.100,547
1,097.495
992,195
906,432
831,114
811,226
688,265
682.148
680,874

74.33
100.00

$ 34,656,036
$ 46,621,650

National Practitioner Data Bank
2000 Annual Report

u.s. Department of Health and Human Services
Health Resources and Services Administration
Bureau of Health Professions
Division of Quality Assurance
5600 Fishers Lane, Suite SA-55
Rockville, MD 20S57
~~Humansemces
He.11lI Resources & Service. Adminlsfralion

Requests for copies of this report and information on the National Practitioner Data Bank should be directed to the
Data Bank Customer Service Center, 1-800-767-6732. This report and other information is also available on the
Internet at www.npdb-hipdb.com.

TABLE 9: Mean and Median Physician Malpractice Payment and Mean Delay Between
Incident and Payment by State
(National Practitioner Data Bank, September 1,1990 - December 31,2000)
2000 Only
Mean
Payment

Median
Payment

Mean
Pavment

2000 Only
Mean Delay Between
Rank of Incident and Payment
Median
(Years)
Pavment Median

Wyoming
WashinQton, DC

$419,757
190,851
260,017
220,591
142,637
236,919
432,536
300,780
259,354
334,301
252,541
259,187
457,855
208,834
224,947
152,740
173,676
174,110
291,497
282,403
370,782
118,501
219,533
211,725
244,638
235,909
181,255
317,017
265,192
309,435
189,018
299,572
312,132
294,939
241,636
275,620
280,034
250,754
266,061
181,771
208,319
195,664
194,039
242,311
144,273
227,289
238,655
254,881
358,075
252,422
584,338

$200,000
100,000
150,000
91,880
55,000
84,997
200,000
150,000
175,000
166,667
120,000
100,000
250,000
75,001
100,000
175,000
75,000
99,999
262,482
150,000
250,000
85,000
100,000
127,750
130,000
125,000
116,250
175,000
111,000
175,000
100,000
150,000
132,500
143.750
115,000
121,000
141,500
192,755
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
110,000
90,000
75,000
150,000
90,000
100,000
162,857
100,000
197,500

$340,185
215,891
204,043
156,838
122,562
163,957
321,721
203,762
215,619
272,735
236,383
206,974
314,680
154,875
158,868
164,208
181,917
136,913
239,370
241,140
282,111
100,363
176,093
187,358
210,058
149,354
118,679
241,242
242,281
237,788
132,400
256,071
237,975
167,869
215,103
241,215
177,817
211,680
252,707
157,092
199,158
216,666
175,346
148,231
144,227
189,753
193,612
202,043
322,035
162,380
397,915

$149,900
75,357
90,000
90,000
41,500
55,000
135,000
90,000
125,000
125,000
75,000
50,000
175,021
75,001
64,875
106,000
75,000
85,000
125,000
115,000
150,000
67,500
72,555
97,500
100,000
60,000
70,000
100,000
125,000
115,000
90,000
125,000
100,000
17,500
90,000
75,128
75,000
150,710
100,000
93,750
65,500
87,500
100,000
49,950
65,000
100,000
75,000
80,000
125,000
75,000
175,000

All Reports

$248,947

$125,000

$202,301

$99,500

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Ar1<ansas
California
Colorado
Conneclicut
Delaware
Florida·
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
"'inois
Indiana·
Iowa
Kansas· ...

Kentucky
Louisiana'"
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska·
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New MexiCO·
NewYor1<
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania·
Rhode tsland
South Carolina·
South Dakota
Tennessee

Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin·

Cumulative

5
33
24
24
51
48
6
24
7
7
36
49
1
35
46
15
36
30
7
13
4
43
41
22
16
47
42
16
7
13
24
7
16
32
24
34
36
3
16
23
44
29
16
50
45
16
36
31
7
36
2

Cumulative
Mean Delay Between
Incident and Payment
(Years)

4.47
4.17
4.03
3.80
3.03
3.67
5.84
4.35
3.96
3.17
3.42
3.33
5.45
5.87
3.26
3.17
4.45
5.26
3.82
4.82
5.64
4.28
2.99
4.29
3.97
4.30
3.65
4.84
4.70
5.65
4.22
6.28
3.93
3,31
4.58
3.56
3.42
5.71
6.03
4.34
3.34
3.71
3.68
3.34
3.36
4.00
4.34
5.26
4.54
3.18
4.92

4.30
3.92
3.80
3.43
3.42
3.33
5.45
4.55
4.06
3.60
4.11
3.33
5.82
5.40
3.19
4.03
4.07
4.91
4,07
4.74
5.96
4.35
3.16
4.05
4.53
4.30
3.89
4.27
4.85
6.24
383
7.06
3.66
3.49
4.50
3.85
3.41
5.99
6.12
4.66
3.48
3.61
3.90
3.50
4.37
3.79
4.38
5.68
4.89
3.19
4.88

4.66

4.83

This table includes only disclosable reports in the NPDB as of December 31,2000. The All Reports row includes jurisdictions not listed
above (Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, etc.).
Rank for payments is based on the median payment amount for each State; 1 is highest, 51 is lowest

• These data are not adjusted for State compensation funds and other similar funds. Mean and median payments for States with payments
made by these funds understate the actual mean and median of amounts received by claimants. Payments made by these funds may also
affect men delay times between incidents and payments. States with these funds are marked with an asterisk .
•• The 2000 mean malpractice payment for Kansas was less than the median payment, which is very unusual. There were no very large
payments to pull the mean above the median.

7

-/rOM the ottO! 0/

SCllatdr &dward jU. KeJtNedy
o/iYlaSPh-chtiseffs

STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY IN OPPOSITION
TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AMENDMENT
July 26, 2002

For Immediate Release
Contact: Jim Manley / Stephanie Cutter
(202) 224-2633
Mr. President, this amendment has nothing to do with the price of
prescription drugs, the cost of health care, or even the insurance
premiums of doctors. It has everything to do with the profits of the
insurance industry.
At a time in
this time of
unbelievable
corporations

which Americans want greater corporate accountability - in
Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate scandals - it is
that our Republican friends now cozy up to big insurance
to give them a break.

Let me remind my colleagues that the legislation before us is about the
high price of prescription drugs and providing a Medicare prescription
drug benefit. Now the Republican side is trying to divert attention from
this important debate by offering this amendment.
It is an attack on the very people which the underlying legislation was
designed to help - those in need of quality medical care. The McConnell
Amendment is designed to shield health care providers from basic
accountability for the care they provide. While those across the aisle
like to talk about doctors, the real beneficiaries will be insurance
companies. This amendment would enrich the insurance industry at the
expense of the most seriously injured patients; men, women and children
whose entire lives have been devastated by medical neglect and corporate
abuse.
This proposal would also shield HMOs that fail to provide needed care,
drug companies whose medicine has toxic side effects, and manufacturers of
defective medical equipment. In recent months the entire nation has been
focused on the need for greater corporate accountability. The McConnell
Amendment does just the reverse.
It would drastically limit the financial responsibility of the entire

http://www .senate. gOYI-kennedy1statements/02/0712002730306.html
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health care industry to compensate injured patients for the harm they have
suffered. When will the Republican Party start worrying about injured
patients and stop trying to shield big business from the consequences of
its wrongdoing? Less accountability will never lead to better health care.
This amendment places major new restrictions on the right of seriously
injured patients to recover fair compensation for their injuries by
placing arbitrary caps on compensation for non-economic loss. These caps
only serve to hurt those patients who have suffered the most severe, lifealtering injuries and who have proven their cases in court.
Non-economic damages compensate victims for the very real, but not easily
quantifiable, losses they sustain when they suffer a serious injury, such
as loss of mobility, paralysis, loss of bodily functions, blindness,
disfigurement, severe and chronic pain, loss of consortium, or loss of
reproductive capacity. These are life-altering conditions which can
deprive a person of the ability to engage in many of the normal activities
of day to day living. They are the last ones we should be depriving of
fair compensation.
Caps are totally arbitrary. They do not adjust the amount of the
compensation ceiling with either the seriousness of the injury, or with
the length of years that the victim must endure the resulting disability.
Someone with a less serious injury can be fully compensated without
reaching the cap. However, a patient with severe, permanent injuries is
prevented by the cap from receiving full compensation for their more
serious injuries. The person with a life-altering injury may only be
permitted to receive a relatively small portion of the compensation to
which he or she is entitled. Is it fair to apply the same limit on
compensation to a person who is confined to a wheelchair for life that is
applied to someone with a temporary leg injury?
Caps discriminate against younger victims. A young person with a severe
injury such as paralysis must endure it for many more years than an older
person with the same injury. Yet, that young person is prohibited from
receiving greater compensation for the many more years he will be
disabled. Is that fair?
Caps on noneconomic damages discriminate against women, children,
minorities, and low income workers. These groups do not receive large
economic damages attributable to lost earning capacity. Thus, noneconomic
damages are particularly important to these vulnerable populations.
Caps in medical cases discriminate against women:

* Women are the victims of medical negligence more frequently than men.
AMA reviewed 48 studies and determined gender discrimination in patient
care is real.
* Women more frequently sustain certain types of injuries which have
grievous consequences, such as miscarriage and loss of reproductive
capacity, disfigurement from cosmetic surgery, psychological injuries, but
do not result in an extended inability to work.
* Women who are homemakers and caregivers for their families sustain no
lost wages when they are injured, so they only receive minimal economic
damages. Ignoring the value of the work they do within the home violates
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the most basic family values.

* Working women tend to have lower earnings than their male counterparts,
and fewer years in the labor force. Thus, their economic damages are
lower.
Caps on noneconomic damages discriminate against children. Children who
sustain lifelong injuries lack a documented earning capacity, and are
often shortchanged in projecting their future lost earnings. Also, caps do
not permit higher compensation for the greater number of years an injured
child must live with his or her disability.
Caps also discriminate against minorities and other low wage workers.
Since they receive less in economic damages for the time they are
incapacitated than higher paid workers, the only way to fairly compensate
them is with noneconomic damages that are not arbitrarily capped.
The elderly are also ill served by caps on noneconomic loss because caps
put the primary focus for compensation on lost wages. For senior citizens,
their life work is at or near an end. Thus, placing limits on how much can
be recovered for pain and incapacity is really an arbitrary cap on their
entire compensation. For patients in nursing homes, noneconomic damages
are the principal financial incentive deterring medical neglect of the
frail and elderly.
If we were to arbitrarily restrict the compensation which seriously
injured patients can receive as the sponsor of this amendment proposes,
what benefits would result? Certainly less accountability for health care
providers will never improve the quality of health care. It will not even
result in less costly care. The cost of medical malpractice premiums
constitutes less than two-thirds of 1% (0.66%) of the nation's health care
expenditures each year. Malpractice premiums are not the cause of the high
rate of medical inflation. Over the decade from 1988 to 1998, the cost of
medical care rose 13 times faster than the cost of malpractice insurance.
Caps are not only unfair to patients, they are also an ineffective way to
control medical malpractice premiums. There is scant evidence to support
the claim that enacting malpractice caps will lower insurance rates. There
is substantial evidence to the contrary. There are other much more direct
and effective ways to address the cost of medical malpractice insurance
that do not hurt patients.
The supporters of the McConnell amendment have argued that restricting an
injured patient's right to recover fair compensation will reduce
malpractice premiums. They cite a report released just yesterday by the
Department of Health and Human Services. However, that data is neither
comprehensive or persuasive. It looks at only ten of the twenty-seven
states that do not currently have a cap on malpractice damages, and it
looks at the rate of increase in those states for only one year. In
essence, that report "cherry picks" the data to support a politically
preordained conclusion.
Let's look at the facts. Twenty-three states currently have a cap on
medical malpractice damages. Most have had those statutes for a
substantial number of years. Twenty-seven states do not have a cap on
malpractice damages. The best evidence of whether such caps effect the
cost of malpractice insurance is to compare the rates in those two groups

of states. Based on data from the Medical Liability Monitor on all fifty
states:

* the average liability premium in 2001 for doctors practicing internal
medicine was slightly less (2.2%) for doctors in states without caps on
malpractice damages ($7,715) than in states with caps on damages ($7,887).
Internists actually pay more for malpractice insurance in the states that
have caps.
* the average liability premium in 2001 for general surgeons was also
slightly less (2.3%) for doctors in states without caps ($26,144) than
states with caps ($26,746). Surgeons are also paying more in the states
that have caps.

* the average liability premium for OB/GYN physicians in 2001 was only
3.3% more for doctors in states without caps ($44,485) than states with
caps ($43,010), a very small difference.
This evidence clearly demonstrates that capping malpractice damages does
not benefit the doctors it purports to help. Their rates remain virtually
the same. It only helps the insurance companies earn even bigger profits.
Since malpractice premiums are not effected by the imposition of caps on
recovery, it stands to reason that the availability of physicians does not
differ between states that have caps and states that do not. AMA data
shows that there are 233 physicians per 100,000 residents in states that
do not have medical malpractice caps and 223 physicians per 100,000
residents in states with caps. Looking at the particularly high cost
specialty of obstetrics and gynecology, states without caps have 29
OB/GYNs per 100,000 women while states with caps have 27.4 OB/GYNs per
100,000 women. Clearly there is no correlation.
California is the state that has had the lowest cap on malpractice damages
the longest. It set a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in the mid
1970s which has not been adjusted for inflation since. If the tort
reformers are correct, you would expect California to have had a smaller
percentage of growth in premiums since those caps were enacted. Between
1991 and 2000, premiums in California actually grew more quickly (3.5%)
than did premiums nationwide (1.9%).
If this amendment were to pass, it would sacrifice fair compensation for
injured patients in a vain attempt to reduce medical malpractice premiums.
Doctors will not get the relief they are seeking. Only the insurance
companies, which created the recent market instability, will benefit.
Even supporters of the industry acknowledge that enacting tort reform will
not produce lower insurance premiums:

* Sherman Joyce, President of the American Tort Reform Association, told
the Liability Week publication, "We wouldn't tell you or anyone that the
reason to pass tort reform would be to reduce insurance rates."
* Victor Schwartz, the Association's General Counsel, told Business
Insurance, " ... many tort reform advocates do not contend that restricting
litigation will lower insurance rates, and 'I've never said that in 30
years. '"
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* The American Insurance Association even released a statement earlier
this year (March 13, 2002) acknowledging, '" [T]he insurance industry never
promised that tort reform would achieve specific premium savings ... "
A National Association of Insurance Commissioners study shows that in
2000, the latest year for which data is available, total insurance
industry profits as a percentage of premiums for medical malpractice
insurance was nearly twice as high (13.6%) as overall casualty and
property insurance profits (7.9%). In fact, malpractice was a very
lucrative line of insurance for the industry throughout the 1990's. Recent
premium increases have been an attempt to maintain high profit margins
despite sharply declining investment earnings.
Insurance industry practices are responsible for the sudden dramatic
premium increases which have occurred in some states in recent months. The
explanation for these premium spikes can be found not in legislative halls
or in courtrooms, but in the boardrooms of the insurance companies
themselves.
There have been substantial increases in recent months in a number of
insurance lines, not just medical malpractice. In 2001, rates for small
commercial accounts have gone up 21%, rates for mid-size commercial
accounts have gone up 32%, and rates for large commercial accounts have
gone up 36%. These increases were attributable to general economic factors
and industry practices, not medical liability tort law.
Insurers make much of their money from investment income. During times
when investments offer high profit, companies compete fiercely with one
another for market share. They often do so by underpricing their plans and
insuring poor risks. When investment income dries up because interest
rates fall, the stock market declines, and/or cumulative price cuts lower
profits, the insurance industry then attempts to increase its premiums and
reduce its coverage. This is a familiar cycle which produces a
manufactured crisis each time their investments turn downward.
For example, St. Paul, one of the largest medical malpractice insurers,
which has been experiencing serious financial difficulties lately,
actually released $1.1 billion in reserves between 1992 and 1997 to
enhance its bottom-line and make those dollars available for investment.
Some of the company's investments did not go well. It lost $108 million in
the collapse of Enron alone. When claims became due, those reserves were
not available to pay them.
A recent study by the Consumer Federation of America presented at a
hearing of the Health Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce last week, documented this industry trend: "It is the "hard"
insurance market and the insurance industry's own business practices that
are largely to blame for the rate shock that physicians have experienced
in recent months." The Consumer Federation's findings are highly
enlightening:

* "Medical malpractice rates are not rising in a vacuum. Commercial
insurance rates are rising overall. * The rate problem is caused by the
classic turn in the economic cycle of the industry, sped up - but not
caused by - terrorist attacks. * Insurers have under-priced malpractice
premiums over the last decade. It would take a 50 percent hike to increase
inflation-adjusted rates to the same level as existed ten years ago. *
Further limiting patients' rights to sue for medical injures would have
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virtually no impact on lowering overall health care costs. Medical
malpractice insurance costs as a proportion of national health care
spending are minuscule, amounting to less than 60 cents per $100 spent.
Insurer losses for medical malpractice have risen slowly in the last
decade, by just over the rate of inflation. * Malpractice claims have not
"exploded" in the last decade. Closed claims - which include claims where
not payout was made - have remained constant, while paid claims have
averaged just over $110,000. * Medical Malpractice profitability over the
last decade has been excellent, at just over 12 percent (per year),
despite a decline in profits in the last two years."
This analysis of why we are seeing a sudden spike in premiums was
basically confirmed by a June 24, 2002 Wall Street Journal article
describing what happened to the malpractice insurance industry during the
1990s.
"Some of these carriers rushed into malpractice coverage because an
accounting practice widely used in the industry made the area seem more
profitable in the early 1990s than it really was. A decade of shortsighted price slashing led to industry losses of nearly $3 billion last
year.
"I don't like to hear insurance - company executives say it's the tort
[injury-law) system - it's self-inflicted," says Donald J. Zuk, chief
executive of Scpie Holdings Inc., a leading malpractice insurer in
California ...
"The losses were exacerbated by carriers' declining investment returns.
Some insurers had come to expect that big gains in the 1990s from their
bond and stock portfolios would continue, industry officials say. When the
bull market stalled in 2000, investment gains that had patched over
inadequate premium rates disappeared."
Let's look at the type of severely injured patients who would be denied
fair compensation under the McConnell Amendment. These are the people who
are being asked by those across the aisle to pay for the mismanagement of
the insurance industry and the wrongdoing of health care providers:
Leyda Uuam (from Massachusetts) underwent surgery to correct a protruding
belly button when she was 5 weeks old. Leyda will never walk, talk, move,
or have any normal function after she suffered brain injury due to a
series of errors by anesthesiologists, nurses, and a transport team.
When Mrs. Oliveira's unborn baby showed fetal distress her doctor failed
to perform a timely cesarean birth as common sense would indicate.
Instead, he attempted a forceps delivery. When this didn't work, he made
three attempts at vacuum extraction, which were also unsuccessful. A
different physician then attempted a second forceps delivery, which also
failed. Finally, Oliveira underwent a cesarean section, yet her son died
within an hour of his birth. An autopsy report identified the cause of
death as asphyxia. The hospital, in an attempt to cover its negligence,
amended the report falsely, listing the cause of death as probably fetal
sepsis.
Twelve year-old Steven Olsen is blind and brain damaged today because of
medical negligence. When he was hiking, he fell on a stick in the woods.
The hospital refused his parents' request for a CAT scan, and instead
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pumped Steven full of steroids and sent him home with a growing brain
abscess. The next day, Steven Olson became comatose and wound up back in
the hospital. Had he received the $800 CAT scan, which would have detected
the brain mass growing in his skull, Steven would be perfectly healthy
today. The jury awarded Steven $7.1 million in non-economic damages for
his life-sentencing of serious illness and disability.
Harry Jordan, a man from Long Beach, underwent surgery to remove a
cancerous kidney. The surgeon took out his healthy kidney instead. Jordan
had been living for years on 10% kidney function, and he is now no longer
able to work.
Elizabeth, a former fashion model, went to the emergency room complaining
of nausea, vomiting, and "the worst headache of her life." The doctor
misdiagnosed her as having an acute neck sprain and sent her home.
Unfortunately, he failed to diagnose her symptoms as the warning leak of a
brain aneurysm even though he had written a textbook which included an
entire chapter on warning leaks. Ten days after her hospital visit,
Elizabeth's aneurysm ruptured and she had a stroke. The bleeding destroyed
brain tissue, requiring the removal of 1/3 of the frontal lobe of her
brain. Elizabeth was left paralyzed as a result of her misdiagnosed
aneurysm.
Philip Lucy's nasal cancer was misdiagnosed by doctors as high blood
pressure and nerve damage for 2 years, although he continued to complain
of pain. It was finally discovered that his left sinus was completely
filled with a cancerous mass. This necessitated the removal of his left
palate, left cheek, left orbit and his left eye.
LeVern Dostal, a recent retiree, died a slow and painful death after her
surgeon failed to give her antibiotics before her gallbladder surgery. She
developed sepsis and was hospitalized for a lengthy period of time, during
which she underwent 3 more surgeries, as her condition slowly
deteriorated.
Ms. Keck, 63, was admitted to the hospital for pneumonia. She sustained
brain injuries because a nurse failed to monitor her oxygen level as
instructed, and failed to notify the doctors of her worsening condition.
She now suffers from paralysis and cannot speak. The hospital was
purposefully understaffed to increase profits.
Under the McConnell Amendment, each of these people would be prevented
from recovering more than $250,000 in non-economic compensation. Can
anyone claim that would be fair?
As we debate this amendment, let us all remember that we are dealing with
people's lives - many of them have suffered life-altering injuries as a
result of substandard medical care. The law is there to protect them, not
to shield those who caused their injuries.
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AlA CITES FATAL FLAWS IN CRITIC'S REPORT ON TORT REFORM
Washington, D.C., March 13,2002 - A recent report claiming that state tort reform
laws have failed to lower insurance premiums is a grossly inaccurate and misleading
attempt to sabotage the continuing need for meaningful tort reform, according to the
American Insurance Association's (AlA) review of the report.
"Premium Deceit _ The Failure of Tort Reform to Cut Insurance Prices," issued by
the Center for Justice and Democracy and co-authored by insurance industry critic 1.
Robert Hunter, is a report whose hypothesis, methodology and conclusions are
riddled with flawed logic, bias and inaccurate statements," said Debra Ballen, AlA
executive vice president.
"The report is neither 'the most extensive review of insurance rate activity .... ever
taken,' nor an accurate evaluation of the tort reform movement in the late twentieth
century," said Ballen. "Instead, the authors have spun a biased yam reflecting their
own distaste for tort reform and efforts to mislead readers as to the continuing need
for meaningful tort reform."
The report's conclusion that, contrary to insurers' promises, state tort reform laws
have failed to achieve lower premiums, fails in four crucial respects:
1. Insurers never promised that tort reform would achieve specific savings, but rather
focused on the benefits of fairness and predictability.
2. The authors' methodology is deeply flawed. Problems include an incorrect time
period analysis and an irrational method of classifying states.
3. The authors' "success test" is overly simplistic and misleading, since liability rules
are just one factor determining claim costs, and claim costs are just one factor
determining the ultimate cost of insurance. Claim costs are also influenced by
accident frequency, population density, medical inflation and underlying economic
conditions. And there are other state-specific factors that affect premium levels, such
as taxes, fees and the degree of market competition.
4. The report ignores all data and evidence of the broader benefits of tort reform, such
as increased equity for all parties and improved system predictability.
Businesses, citizen groups, and insurers across the country view tort reform as
enhancing the rights of those who are truly injured to obtain compensation from those
who are truly at fault, while weeding out frivolous and fraudulent claims. "In other
words, a more balanced legal system for all parties," said Ballen.
"Contrary to the authors' erroneous conclusions, tort reform has helped to make the
civil justice system fairer, and it has improved insurance market conditions by
making insurance costs more stable and predictable. And that is what happened

http://www.aiadc.org/outboundicreditlCR_7027_42~J.htm
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during the late 1980s and 1990s, due in part to the refonns of the mid-to-Iate 1980s."

###

The American Insurance Association represents more than 412 major insurance companies that
provide all lines of property and casualty insurance and write more than $87 billion annually in
premiums. The association is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has representatives in every
state. All AlA press releases are available at www.aiadc.Qrg.
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TORT REFORMS DON'T CUT LIABILITY RATES, STUDY SAYS
Insurance premiums have not dropped in states where tort reform measures have been enacted, a new study by a
consumers group concludes.
By comparing tort reform measures enacted by states since 1985 with the states' insurance rates, the report found
that tort reform has had no impact on commercial rates. This finding contradicts claims by tort reform supporters
that laws restricting litigation will reduce insurance costs, according to the study, issued by the Citizens for Corporate
Accountability & Individual Rights, a New York-based non-profit consumer group.
"Officials have been severely misled into believing that if they passed these laws, insurance rates would drop in their
states," Joanne Doroshow, CCAIR's executive director and co-author of the study, said at a press conference last
week in New York announcing the findings.
''There is a hoax being perpetrated on the public and lawmakers in this country," she further stated. ''This report
undermines the principal argument used today by tort reform proponents that the system is too costly."
Tort reform advocates, however, say the study misstates their position and fails to take into account all the factors
that influence insurance rates.
The study looked at tort reform laws passed by states from 1985 through 1998. These laws include caps on punitive
damages or modifications to the rule of joint-and-several liability.
By examining the number of laws and providing greater weight to those enacted in earlier years, the states were
divided into three groups: those with the fewest tort limits, those with moderate limits and those with the most.
The study then gathered information from the Insurance Services Office Inc. on rates it recommends insurers charge
in each state for the different liability lines.
Then, the study compared the different state laws and rates to see if those states with more tort reform laws had
lower insurance rates.
Three areas of insurance were examined: general liability, product liability and medical malpractice liability.
The results showed that there is no relation between more tort reform and lower insurance rates.
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"It's clear as to the whole system, tort reform has not worked," concluded J. Robert Hunter, co-author of the study
and director of insurance for the Consumer Federation of America in Washington, O.c.
For example, the states with the fewest tort reforms saw general liability rate increases of 45.6% between 1985 and
1998, while those with modest reforms saw general liability rates rise 49.1 % and those with the most tort reforms
saw such rates rise by 48.8% during that period, the report states.
In the area of product liability, the states with fewest reforms saw rates increase by 80.4%, those with modest
reforms saw 52% increases, and those with the most reforms saw rates increase by 74.8%.
Medical malpractice results show the same lack of direct correlation between tort reform and lower insurance rates,
the report found.
Even though medical malpractice rates showed the lowest increase in states with the most reforms, the rates were
lower in states with few reforms than they were in states with moderate reform. In states with the fewest reforms,
medical malpractice rates increased 179.5% between 1985 and 1998, while those with moderate reforms saw rates
increase 214.5% and those with the most reforms saw rate hikes totaling 120.2% during that period.
Based on these findings, the report calls illogical the assumption that more tort reform measures will result in lower
rates.
'The only reasonable conclusion is that no clear evidence of tort law change impacting insurance prices is
determinable from these data," the report states.
A similar picture appeared when individual states' experience was examined.
For example, in Wisconsin, where few reforms were passed, general liability rates climbed 19.2%, while neighboring
Minnesota, a high reform state, saw its rates rise by 19.5%. Similarly, in Massachusetts, which passed no tort reform
laws at all, rates rose by 25.9%, while Connecticut, where three laws were passed in the 1980s, saw rates rise
61.5%.
The report was criticized by tort reform advocates.
Victor Schwartz, a partner with the Washington law firm of Crowell & Moring and a leading tort reform advocate, said
"just looking at rates doesn't answer the question," as many insurance policies may have higher rates because they
offer broader coverage or a lower deductible.
But, more importantly, he said, many tort reform advocates do not contend that restricting litigation will lower
insurance rates. "I've never said that in 30 years," he said.
He also pOinted out that insurers can't rely on tort reform measures in formulating rates because the laws are often
watered down with exceptions or are struck down by courts as unconstitutional. But a solid tort reform measure
without easy exceptions that is upheld as constitutional will reduce insurance rates, Mr. Schwartz said.
Sherman Joyce, president of the American Tort Reform Assn. in Washington, agreed, saying that tort reform is not
just about lower insurance rates.
"We think the real focus (of tort reform) should be on (restricting) the payment of punitive damages," rather than on
lowering insurance costs, he said.
Although he hadn't yet seen the study, Patrick Watts, assistant vp for the Alliance of American Insurers in Downers
Grove, III., questioned its sponsor's goal.
"Do they want to eliminate all restrictions on litigation?" he asked.
While, in theory, tort reform measures should reduce insurance costs, "tort reform is only one thing in the mix" that
determines insurance rates, he said.
Copies of "Premium Deceit -- The Failure of 'Tort Reform' to Cut Insurance Prices" are available for $100 by sending
a check or money order to CCAIR, P.O. Box 3326, Church Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10008.

By Michael Prince
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State insurance program holds off
on lowering rates
By JOELLE BABULA
REVIEW -JOURNAL

Doctors insured by the state's emergency liability insurance program will not
see a drop in premiums soon.
The state's Medical Liability Association of Nevada is the second insurance
company in two weeks to announce premiums will not be lowered despite
passage of a new medical malpractice bill. The bill was passed to help stem
the exodus of doctors who cannot find malpractice insurance or afford the
skyrocketing rates.
"We're not lowering rates anytime soon," said Bob Byrd, chairman of the
Medical Liability Association of Nevada. "It's really premature to jack prices
back right now. We're very pleased with the tort reform package, and we're
optimistic about the future and the end result, but we won't know the end
result for another year or two. "
The company was formed in April as a last resort for Nevada doctors who
cannot find medical malpractice insurance. The company insures 251
doctors.
Last week American Physicians Assurance said it would not be reducing
premIUms soon.
Although doctors were hoping insurance companies would roll back
premiums after the passage of new legislation, most say they realize the laws
will take several years to have an effect on the insurance industry.
"Meaningful tort reform was not expected to dramatically change the pricing
of insurance premiums," Dr. Ikram Khan said. "The stability in the market
comes after a period of time. It's unrealistic to expect dramatic change."
Khan said doctors must decide whether they can wait a few years to see
relief.
Nearly 150 doctors have left the state, retired early or are preparing to leave.
Others, such as obstetricians and trauma surgeons, have stopped providing
high-risk surgeries or delivering babies.
http://www.lvrj.comlcgi-biniprintable.cgi?llvrLhome/2002/Aug-14-Wed-2002/news/19408...
""..,

9/612002

Most Clark County obstetricians stopped taking new patients in May because
they said they could not afford to deliver more babies. Many of them began
taking new patients again after the legislation's passage.
Dr. John Nowins, president of the Clark County OB/GYN Society, said
many obstetricians began taking new patients this week in good faith that
insurance companies would start to lower prices. He said the doctors may
have to close their doors again if prices do not come down.
"Obstetricians are still in a bind," he said. "I can't be too optimistic."
According to the society, 33 obstetricians have closed their practices, retired
early or have stopped delivering babies because of medical liability
problems.
This story is located at:
http://www.lvrj.comllvrj home120021Aug-14-Wed-2002/newsI19408288.html
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Like similar anecdotes in almost every state,
the tale of the dIsgusted railroad has been repeatcd lor years in Texas. It even made its way into a
. conservative research center's report as proof of
~what most people believe anyway: havoc is being
wreaked and Jobs lost by an irrational legal

duced the 1994 jury award.
Marc Galanter, a law professor at the Utliversi,
ty of Wisconsin, described these popular stories
about the courts as "legal legends" 111 the Arizona
Law Review last year. The label is sticking and
some scholars and consumer advocates are starting to systematically challenge their accuracy.
They say legends like the one about the Texas
railroad have been used to maximum effect by a
natIOnal business-supported movement to make
it harder for plaintiffs to win lawsuits under tort
law, which governs civil inlury claims. Just last
week, the Alabama Legislature passed sweeping
tort law changes, including a bill that would put a
cap on punitive damages awarded by juries,

system.
""t, lIke many legal horror stories, it may not
have been 100 percent true. "It was kind of "
coincidence of timmg," said Mark Davis, ,.:
spokesman lor UnIOn Pacific, which merged witt
SQuthern PaCIfic in 1996. "Southern Pacific wa'
studying that Itne to b~ abandoned anyway."
For years across the country, accounts of hi
za~re jury verdicts and huge damage award,
(like the McDonald's customer who spilled colfe.
on herself and collected $2.9 millIon) have beer:
used to prove that the courts are wacky or worse
But l11creasingly, some political scientists, legal
,cholars and consumer advocates are suggesting
that outlandish examples have created a distort·
~d picture of the legal system.
Huge punitive damage awards, for example,
have become everyday events, right? Actually, a
studv of courts in the nation's 75 largest countle,
conducted by the National Center for State Court:
found that onlv 364 of 762,000 cases ended ir
punitive damages, or 0.047 percent.
O.K., but isn't it true that more and man
liability claims are filed every year? Actually, ,
study of 16 states by the same center showed tha'
the number of liability suits has declined by!'
percent since 1986.
Well, didn't that McDonald's coffee drinke!
laugh all the way to the bank? Maybe, but she wa~
81 years old, the coffee was scalding and Shl
needed skin grafts for thtrd-degree burns. Am
,.he settled for about Sr,OO.OOO after a judge ro

a Fantas~y
.dy every state has conSidered similar
:res since the mid-1980's, and most have
iJassed some measures to limit lawsuits.
. "The story of tort reform across the country is
that it is one of the most carefully developed and
l'xquisitely executed political campaigns ever,"
said Andrew F. Popper, a law professor at American University in Washington who is an expert on
personal l11.1ury law and identifies himself as a
supporter of consumer rights.
One advocate's distortion, of course, is another's innocent spin. David Shaffer, president of the
Public PolIcy Institute, a New York business
group pushl11g for lawsuit limits in New York,
said examples of ostensible outrages are used by
consumer advocates as well as business groups.
"It's done on both sides," he said. "The trial
fa,,),ers drag in pIctures portraying some person
who has been a victim of a terrible accident."
VEN if there are occasional exaggera·
tions, som. e business lobbyists say, there
are enough large verdicts to mtlmldate
corporatIon, mto large settlements and
inhibit innovation by making companies fearful
of bringmg out new products that might attract
lawsuits. The possibility of huge jury awards and
the expense of battling suits, they say, combine to
~eep useful products off consumers' shelves.
But some lawvers and academics argue that
:onslstently far-fetched accounts of court rulings
have warped the debate about the legal system.
And shrewd public relations by bUSIness and
other groups pushmg to limit lawsuits may only
be part of the reason.
Unusual or big verdicts make news, saId Michael W. McCann, a political science professor at
the University of Washington. Professor McCann
and William Haltom of the University of Puget
Sound in Tacoma, Wash., found in a study that the
large McDonald's verdict got extensive frontpage coverage in 1994. But only about half the
newspapers carried articles when the judge later
"educed the punitive damages to $480,000.
In similar research, Oscar G. Chase, a law
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But est:matmg dlS~a!1(,ps beyond
:he range of parailax - recently
iet at a mere few hundred lightyears - has required more Imagination. The Carnegie observations
rely on stars called Cepheid variables, which bhnk at a rate believed to vary with their brightness. If two of these beacons are
pulsatmg at the same pace and one
appears dimmer, then it is assumed to be farther away. But the
system is fraught with uncertainty.
To confidently measure absolute
as opposed to relative distance, you
have to calibrate the yardstick by
directly measuring how far away
the nearest Cepheids are. Astronomers have tried to do this using
parallactic observations by the European Space Agency satellite Hipparcos. But the measurements are
tricky and the data unsure.
And there are other problems. A
CepheId's rhythm may be thrown
off by its metallic content More
guesswork comes in when astronomers try to Judge how much of the
dimming of a Cepheid's light
comes nor from distance but intervening cosmic dust.

HE results from the Very
Long Baseline Array cut
through these assumptions, measuring the dlS-.:fance of a galaxy (NGC 4258 in the
,v:onstellation Ursa Major) with oldfashioned parallax. By using computers to coordinate the data from
10 radiO telescopes, ranging from
Hawaii across North America to
the Virgin Islands, the astronomers essentially simulated a dish
antenna thousands of miles wide.
This let them measure the galaxy's
radio wave emissions with a resolution so fine that it puts even the
Hubble telescope to shame.
The astronomers focused on a
rotating disk of gas at the galaxy's
core. First thev calculated how fast
it was spmning by measuring how
much the Doppler effect stretched
and squeezed its radio waves. Then
they compared this intrinsic velocity to how fast the disk appears to
spin from Earth. The farther something is, the slower it seems to
move - parallax again. Think of
how a jet plane seems to inch
across the sky. Trigonometry then
yields the distance.
Though this new method greatly
expands the power of parallax, it
still has its limits. The galaxy was
measured at 23.5 million lightyears away; the universe is billions of light-years wide. Reaching
farther will still require Cepheids
and other indirect methods. But
now there may be a better way to
ensure the accuracy of these yardsticks, putting a more solid foundation under astronomers' feet.
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nearly 'itJ6JI{I(I VISitors. The recent Jackson Pollock show at the Museum of MOdern Art in New
York also proved a bonanza, drawing nearly
330,000 visitors, a striking number, if still short of
the 940,000 - more than 8,000 a day - who
swamped the museum's Matisse show of 1991.
The John Singer Sargent show, which closed
last week at the National Gallery in Washington,
drew about 425,000 viSitors, or nearly 4,500 a day,
catapulting it into the realm of the smash 1995
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professor at New York University,
found in a survey of cases in the New
York area that the average verdict
reported by The New York Times in
1989 was $20.5 million. But including
the much larger number of cases
that did not attract media attention,
the .verage verdict was really $1.1
million.
"Policy makers," Mr. Chase said
in an interview, "can't reliably use
their impressions from reading the
press about issues like whether the
court system is out of control."
The problem, some legal experts
say, is that policy makers do rely on
such impressions. In his law review
article, Professor Galanter traced
the long afterlife of an infamous 1986
case involving a Philadelphia psychic who won a $1 million verdict.
She had claimed she had an allergic
reaction to medical treatment and
lost her psychic powers.
The story of the psychic's verdict
was widely Circulated. Eventually,
Professor Galanter found, it found
its way into a 1991 report of the
President's Council on Competitiveness, which referred to such bizarre
cases as "almost commonplace" but
did not disclose that the psychic's
verdict had been reversed and that
she had collected nothing.
Business groups say they are at a
disad,-antage in a public relations
war that often spotlights alarming
accounts of supposedly risky products, dangerous drugs and cancercausing chemicals. "Emotions are
stirred more when people are frightened for their own safety than they
are by large damage awards that
are not going to be paid out of their
own money," said Victor E.
Schwartz, a Washington lawyer who
lobbies for businesses on tort issues.
But consumer groups say accounts of ostensible outrages in the
courts seem more methodically misleading than reports about product
dangers. A recent report by Citizens
lor Corporate Accountability and Individual RIghts, a New York con-

Ple"~t>

SKED whether the report
was misleading, Mr. Shaffer
of the Public Policy Institute said anecdotes were
less important than the harmful impact of the overall legal system on
corporate innovation. "It is impossible," he added, "to include complete
information about everything."
True or false, legal legends do
make effective debating points. In a
series of interviews recentlv in Texas, several leaders of a movement to
end "lawsuit abuse" mentioned the
case of the railroad that abandoned
Matagorda County in Texas because
of excessive lawsuits.
Richard W_ Weekley, a Houston
businessman who is a leader of Texans for Lawsuit Reform, said in a
recent interview he had used the
railroad story for years in speeches
as an example of legal craziness.
Audiences are horrified, he said.
"People sit there and say, 'Why is a
railroad tearing up 28 miles of
track?' " Mr. Weekley said.
In response to an inquiry from a
reporter, Mr. Davis, the railroad
spokesman, said" Litigation was last
on the totem pole" among reasons
for ceaSing operations in Matagorda
County. "Traffic Was down to one
freight car a year."
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Consumer advocates and some legal scholars say the public's image
of the legal system is coloreo by myths. Test your s~sceptibility.
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sumer group, said the Public Policy
Institute had "misreported and misused" every case it described in its
efforts to show that the New York
courts were out of control.
"They usually don't mention that
the defendant did anything wrong,"
said the consumer group's executive
director, Joanne Doroshow, a former
associate of Ralph Nader.
One supposedly outrageous case
the Institute cited in a report last
year involved an award of $650,000
given by New York City to the family
of a drunk driver who was killed in
an accident while driving the wrong
wayan a parkway. The Institute did
not disclose that the court said the
city's signs "virtually invited wrongway entry," the consumer group
said.
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Sometimes, the Verdict Is a Fantasy
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False, McDonald's coHee was at least 20 degrees
hotter than In other restaurants and the company had
received some 700 complaints about burns in the
prevIous decade. The woman later settled for $600,000
after a judge reduced the $2.9 million jury award.

A West Virginia convenience srare wo'ker won more than $2. 7 million
few years ago after she Injured her back while opening a pickle jar.
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True, But a court said her employer discharged her
because her inlury restflcted her activity. then
retali2ted against her and engaged in -willful, meanspirited acts indicative of an intent to cause physical or
emotional harm:
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Cities are routinely forced to pay gargantuan awards for frivolous suits.

False, In New York City, for example, 29,835 new
claims were filed in 1997. In the same year 38 cases
were resolved for $1 million or more, representing 26
percent of the total paid out that year. The plaintiffs
were found to have malar Injuries like paralysis and
brain damage as a result of accidents with city vehicles
and of malpractice at city hospitals.
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America has 70 percent of the world's lawyers
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False, This has been repeated for years by figures like

0," O~" , " 1m, ?~.

"we" ""'~ 0<,"'''.

tlons from New York to Singapore. Marc Galanter, 8
University of Wisconsin law professor. says it is "global
folklore" and estimates that America has a quarter of
the total. He is not. however, arguing for more lawyers.

Llabi/ltv cases are out of control.
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True and false, A study of 16 states found that there
,were 58 percent more liability cases filed in 1997 than
in 1975. But the same study showed that there were
9 percent fewer cases filed in 1997 than in 1986.
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Testimony of
Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director
Consumer Federation of America

Before the
Subcommittee on Health
of Ute House Committee on Energy and Commerce

Regarding Medicall\1alpractice

Good morning. I am Travis Plunkett, legislative director for the Consumer Federation of
America. CF A is a non-profit association of more than 290 organizations founded in 1968 to
advance the consumer interest through advocacy and education. Ensuring the provision of fairly
priced and adequate insurance has been one of our core concerns since CFA's inception.
I would like to thank Chainnan Bilirakus, Ranking Member Brown and the other members of
the Subcommittee for the opportunity to offer our comments on this extremely important issue.
For the third time in less than thirty years, Congress and state legislators across the country are
grappling with the problem of fast-rising medical malpractice rates. Insurers insist that a sharp
increase in large, unwarranted jury verdicts is to blame for the crisis. As a result, lawmakers on
this Subcommittee and in a variety of states are considering legislation to place further limits on
the legal rights of Americans who have been harmed or killed by medical malpractice.
But research by actuary and CF A Director ofInsurance 1. Robert Hunter shows that insurers
are pointing fmgers when they should be looking in the mirror. It is the "hard" insurance market
and the insurance industry's own business practices that are largely to blame for the rate shock
that physicians have experienced in recent months. CFA has found that:
£S

£s

£s

£s

£s

£s

£s

I.

Medical malpractice rates are not rising in a vacuum. Commercial insurance rates are
rising overall.
The rate problem is caused by the classic tum in the economic cycle of the industry, sped
up--but not caused by--terrorist attacks.
Insurers have under-priced malpractice premiums over the last decade. It would take a
50 percent rate hike to increase inflation-adjusted rates to the same level as existed ten
years ago.
Further limiting patients' rights to sue for medical injuries would have virtually no
impact on lowering overall health care costs. Medical malpractice insurance costs as a
proportion of national health care spending are miniscule, amounting to less than 60 cents
per $100 spent.
Insurer losses for medical malpractice have risen slowly in the last decade, by just over
the rate of inflation.
Malpractice claims have not "exploded" in the last decade. Closed claims-which
include claims where no payout was made-- have remained constant, while paid claims
have averaged just over $110,000.
Medical Malpractice profitability over the last decade has been excellent, at just over 12
percent, despite a decline in profits in the last two years.

Putting Medical Malpractice Insurance Rates into Context: Insurer Practices
and the Insurance Cycle

A. Commercial Insurance Rates Overall Are Rising
To put price increases in insurance anywhere in America today into context, you have to be
aware of a general tendency toward higher rates nationally. According to data released by the

1

Council ofInsurance Agents (CCIA) and Brokers,l commercial premiums are increasing
quickly. According to estimates made by CF A based upon the CCIA data for the 12-month
period ending December 31, 200 I, average prices rose as follows:
Small Commercial Accounts
Mid-size Commercial Accounts
Large Commercial Accounts

+21%
+32%

The worst hit are, not surprisingly, "terrorist target" risks, such as skyscrapers,
According to the CCIA survey, CF A calculates the average increases over the last year by line of
msurance as:
+30%
+46%
+28%
+47%
+27%

Business Interruption
Construction
Commercial Cars
Property
General '
Umbrella Liability
Workers' Compensation

+56°/~

+24%

rate increases are occurring even when terrorism is excluded.
The market shows all the earmarks of a classic cycle bottom, which is discussed in some detail
below,

B.

There is a Classic" Hard" Cycle Nationallv--with Prices Rising Accelerated by
the Events of September 11 th

Insurance is a cyclical business. This is particularly true in the medical malpractice
insurance business. In the mid-1970s, the country experienced the fIrst liability insurance CrISis.
In this case, the crisis was particularly acute in product liability insurance and medical
malpractice insurance,
At the mid-70s cycle low, the industry's rate of return was "2.6% in 1975," rose "to
19.7% in 1977, a gain of almost 17 points in the course of only two years. The industry's rate of
return then fell by more than 17 points over the next 7 years to 1.9% in 1984, the nadir of that
soft market During the subsequent hard market, profits once again shot up ... to 15.4%" (by
1987).2
The rnid-1980s crisis was in commercial liability generally, hitting municipalities, day
care centers, environmental liability, medical malpractice and many other liability risks and
lines. Time magazine had a cover story called "Sorry America, Your Coverage is Cancelled."

4th Quarter 2001 Survey, released January 2002.
Cycles and Crises in Property/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications, edited by Cummings, Harrington and
Klell1. NAIC, 1991. Page 11
I

2

2

Two charts below show the cyclical nature of insurance. 3 The first chart, "Insurance
Cycle" shows the operating income as a percentage of premium from 1967 to 2001. The
operating income of the industry falls below zero four times on the chart - in 1975, in 1984 and
1985, in 1992, and in 2001 (the last number estimated by CFA).

INSURANCE CYCLE
15 -----..

-10 ---- -_._.. -'-.. -'~---'
YEAR (2001 estimated)

The 1992 data point was not a classic cycle bottom, but reflected the impact of Hurricane
Andrew and other catastrophes in that year.
The 1975 and mid-80s bottoms were both classic cycle bottoms with very sizeable price
increases and coverage availability problems immediately following the bottom. Consider the
mid-80s cycle tum: between 1977 and 1984, insurance premiums had" ... actually declined (by)
4.4% ... from 1984 to 1987, net premiums written increased 63.3% .. .',4
The price increases in this cycle tum began in late 2000. 5 The rate of change was
accelerating upward before September 11 tho The terrorist attacks sped up the price increases into
what some seasoned industry analysts see as gouging. 6 Many examples of unjustified price
increases have surfaced in the last few months. 7 8
3 Both ofthese charts use data from A. M. Best and Co., Aggregates and Averages, 2001 edition for all years
except 2001, where CFA made estimates ofthe results based on current information.
4 Cycles and Crises in PropertY/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications, edited by Cummings, Harrington and
Klein, NAIC, 1991. Page 8.
5 "The Big Question For 2002: Will Hard Market Last Long?" By Sean F. Mooney, National Underwriter, January
7, 2002 edition.
6 " ... there is clearly an opportunity now for companies to price gouge - and it's happening ... But I think companies
are overreacting, because they see a window in which they can do it." Jeanne Hollister, consulting actuary,
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, in, "Avoid Price Gouging, Consultant Warns," National Underwriter, January 14, 2002.
7 "As Insurers Hike Prices, State Regulators Consider Reducing Regulatory Authority," Consumer Federation of
America, December 5, 2001.
8 "We've seen premiums go up as much as 40-70 percent," says (Jenny] Jones [CEO of Elkins/Jones insurance
brokerage]. She points out that commercial buildings which now pay five or six cents per square foot for insurance
need to budget for costs to go up to as much as seven or eight cents a foot. She says the increases could be across
the board for all types of properties. Single family housing developers could be sharply affected, she notes, citing

3
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Gougmg
does occur as the cycle turns. The evidence is very strong that what we
are experiencing is a classic underwriting cycle turn into a "hard," from a prolonged "soft,"
market.
According to the National Association ofInsurance Commissioners, " ... underwriting
cycles may be caused by some or all of the follm.ving factors:
L Adverse loss shocks ... unusually large loss shock ... may lead to supracompetitive prices.
2. Changes in interest rates ...
.. m
. so ft mar k ets ... ,.10
3 . lJ n d er pncmg
Prior to September 11 th, the industry
since the late 1980s. The
usual six to ten year economic cycle had been
the amazing stock market of the
1
No matter how much they cut their rates, the insurers wound up with a great year \vhen
investing the float on the premium in this amazing market (the "float" occurs during the time
between when premiums are paid into the insurer and losses paid out by the insurer - e.g., there
is about a 15 month lag in auto insurance). Further, interest rates were relatively high in recent
years as the Fed focused on inflation.
But, m the last two years, the market turned with a vengeance and the Federal Reserve
cut interest rates again and again. Item 2 above had occurred well before September I Jlh
Item 3 above, the low rates, were also apparent. The chart, "Insurance Cycle," shows the
operating profit drop from about 13% of premium in 1997 to about 3.5% of premium in 2000.
So, before September 11 th, the cycle had turned, rates were rising and a hard market was
developing. An anticipated price jump of 10% to 15% in 2001 was predicted by CF A and
confirmed by the Insurance Information Institute.
Item 1, the shock loss was all that was missing. September II th provided that in an
achingly painful way.
However, the increases are mostly due to the cycle turn. The price increases were sped
up by the terrorist attack, collapsing two years of anticipated increases into a few months, but the
bulk of the increases are not related to pricing for terrorism, per se. This is a classic economic
cycle.

one homebuilder whose liability premium doubled at the November 11 renewal." "Large Insurance Premium
Increases in 2002 as September 11 Ricochets Through Industry, Expert Advises," Business Wire. January 3, 2002.
9 "To be sure, the market began firming in 2000. But the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks sent insurance prices
skyrocketing far beyond the estimates of increases that earlier were being attributed to a normal hard cycle." ., Year
in Review," Business Insurance, December 24,2001.
10 Cycles and Crises in PropertY/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications, edited by Cummings, Harrington
and Klein, NAIC, 1991. Page 339.
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The question we hear a lot of debate about is how long the hard market can last. Given
the amazing inflow of capital, can the prices hold for long? While the jury is still out on that
question, there are some factors that make it seem likely that the hard market will be brief. They
include:
?
?
?
?

The capital inflow in excess of the after-tax terrorism loss,
The relatively overcapitalized position of the industry as shown in the chart, "Leverage
Ratio," below,
The availability of alternative risk mechanisms to the larger client risks, the insureds with
the biggest price hikes,
The pattern of risk managers blaming insurers, not the terrorism event, for renewal
problems, and shopping for better deals. II
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A "leverage ratio" is the ratio of net premiums written (i.e., after reinsurance) to the
surplus, the amount of money the insurer has to back up the business; assets less the liabilities.
Surplus is not reserves, which are liabilities set up to cover claims. The leverage ratio has
always been the key measure of insurer strength.
The rule of thumb used for decades by insurance regulators and other experts in
determining solidity is the so-called" Kenny I 2 Rule" of $2 of premium for each $1 of surplus as
safe and efficient use of capital. Some now say that this rule is antiquated, given the new level
of catastrophe possible, but new ways of spreading the risk, such as securitizing it, may offset
this. CFA still believes a 2: I ratio is safe. But even those proposing a lower ratio do not go
below 1.5:1. The NAIC uses a 3:1 ratio as the standard for determining ifan individual insurer
warrants solvency inspection.
When the cycle turned in the mid-70s, the premium/surplus ratio was as high as 2.8 to 1.
This was a dangerously high average ratio since many insurers exceeded the 3: 1 NAIC problem
II
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"Risk Managers Blame Insurers for Renewal Woes," National Underwriter, January 14, 2002
Named after a famous insurance fmancial writer, Roger Kenny.
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ratio. When the mid-80s cycle turned, the ratio was as high as 1.8 to 1 - a relatively safe level.
today's cycle tum, CFA projects the ratio for 200 I year-end to be about L2 to I, extremely
indeed, overcapitalized.

ITL llule Facts About l\ledicai Malpractice Claims and Losses

As the lengthy explanation above demonstrates, the practices of the insurance industry itself
are to largely to blame for the wildly gyrating business cycle of the last thirty years. Each time
the cycle turns from a soft to a hard market the response by insurers is predictable: they shift
from inadequate under-pricing to unconscionable over pricing, cut back on coverage and blame
large jury verdicts for the problem. It is particularly appalling to see a crisis caused by insurer
action being blamed, by the very insurers that caused the problem, on others. Insurers seem to
expect legislators and the American public to swallow the dubious line that trial lawyers have
managed to time their million-dollar jury verdicts to coincide precisely with the bottom of the
insurance cycle three times in the last thirty years. Medical malpractice insurance rates are now
rising fast. Insurers tell the doctors it is the fault of the legal system and urge them to go to state
legislatures or to Congress and seek restrictions on the rights of their patients. Physician
associations, unfortunately, are only too willing to accept this faulty logic.
Although rates are obviously now increasing, medical malpractice insurance losses are not
"exploding" and have actually declined by one significant measure. CF A's Director of Insurance,
J. Robert Hunter, conducted an actuarial analysis of medical malpractice insurance using the
most recent insurance data available from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
and Aivt Best and Company. He found the following:
I. Inflation-adjusted medical malpractice premiums have declined by one -third in the
last decade. Exhibit A shows that the average medical malpractice premium per doctor
barely climbed from $7,701 in 1991 to $7,843 in 2000, an increase of 1.9 percent. Rates
in constant 2000 dollars have declined by 32.5 percent, when the medical care services
Consumer Price Index is taken into consideration, It would take a rate increase of 48
percent to bring premium rates in 2000 back to the 1991 price level. This chart points to
insurer pricing practices (e.g. under-pricing during a soft market followed by a sharp
increase in premiums as the market has hardened) as a key culprit in the rate shock that
many physicians are now experiencing.
2. l\lcdical malpractice as a percentage of national health care expenditures are a
fraction of the cost of health care in this nation. Over the last decade, for every $100
of national health care costs in the United States, medical malpractice insurance cost
66 cents. In the latest year (2000) the cost is 56 cents, the second lowest rate of the
decade. Exhibit B shows that malpractice premiums as a share of health costs have
declined from .95 percent in 1988 to .56 percent in 2000. Medical malpractice insurance
is actually an amazing value as it covers all medical injuries for about one-half of one
percent of all health costs. Moreover, this chart shows that proposals to further limit
patients' rights to sue for medical injuries have little, if any, value in terms oflowering
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overall health care costs. The maximum potential savings of eliminating all rights for
injured patients to seek legal redress would be under 60 cents on a $100 medical bill.
3. There is no "explosion" in the severity of medical malpractice claims . Only about
one in four persons who bring a claim (24.6%) get any payment at all. Each closed claim
in America-which includes all million-dollar verdicts-averaged only $27 ,824 for the
decade ending December 31, 2000. This includes costs for insurer defense and claims
adjustment. The figures over the decade showed no growth in average paid claim. If one
looks at average payout just for claims with payments (as opposed to all closed claims)
the average loss was $112,987. This includes costs for defense of claims settled,
adjudicated or otherwise closed with no payment, thereby overstating the cost per claim
paid. (See Exhibit C.)
4.

Medical malpractice insurance losses have risen very slowly . Incurred losses,
including loss adjustment expense (LAE) has risen by one-half of one percent over the
last decade on a per-capita basis more than medical inflation. (See Exhibits A and C.)
Furthermore, Exhibit D shows that medical malpractice losses haven't come anywhere
close to approaching or exceeding premiums, as they did in the early 1980s. In other
words, losses have increased on a fairly regular, predictable basis, like most goods and
services subject to inflation. The problem, as pointed out in 1 above, is that premiums
have not kept up with losses.

5. Medical Malpractice profitability over the last decade has been excellent. Despite a
decline in profitability in the last three years, the average return on net worth for medical
malpractice lines was still a handsome 12.3% over the last decade. (See Exhibit E.)

III. Solutions
Both the states and Congress must act to deal with the true source of the malpractice
insurance price increases: insurer pricing practices and the volatile insurance cycle. As usual
with insurance issues, state regulators must take the lead. CFA has called on the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners to thoroughly investigate rate hikes in both personal
and property/casualty lines and to consider a number of specific reforms to freeze or rollback
unwarranted rate hikes and to prevent rate shock in the future. States can also take steps to spur
private market development of increased insurance alternatives (such as captive insurance
companies, risk retention groups, purchasing groups and the creation of new mutual insurance
companies) and to increase the availability of insurance through public resources (such as joint
underwriting associations and insurance facilities.)
The states could also act to provide relief to the medical specialists, such as obstetricians
and neurologists, who bear the brunt of medical malpractice costs. The problem, from an
insurance point-of-view, is that the risk is too concentrated on too few providers. The highest
risk patients, who have illnesses or conditions where a slight provider error can cause grave harm
or death, are usually "referred up" from general practitioners and internists to specialists. For
example, only the very worst risks of all bad backs in a particular state end up being treated by
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neurosurgeons. Yet a few neurosurgeons bear the full cost of these risks; none of the risk is
borne by referring physicians. This risk should be spread somewhat, because non-specialist
physicians benefit financially from this structure (lower risk patients are less costly in
malpractice terms.) States should consider requiring insurers to impose a "high-risk referral" fee
on all physicians, that could then be adjusted upward for risk depending on the class of
practitioner and used to lower insurer costs in the highest-risk classes.
Congress could act to address rising malpractice rates by creating a national
reinsurance facility. All insurers writing medical malpractice would be members of the facility.
Members would cede the premiums and claims over a set catastrophic amount to the facility.
The facility would take all risk over this retention and would charge an actuarially-based
premium for this coverage. The premium would NOT be allowed to fluctuate downward during
the economic cycle of the medical malpractice insurance market, thereby serving to stabilize the
premium cycle as well as make insurance more readily available through spreading the cost of
large injuries to a national base. The reinsurance plan would have to be administered by a
federal agency-the Department of Health and Human Services is probably the best bet-but
there would be no taxpayer funding. Cost of premiums and of program administration \,.:ould be
paid out of the premiums ceded to the facility. HHS would utilize the data generated on these
catastrophic claims to report to Congress on ways to decrease medical errors and malpractice.
There have been three medical
crises, in the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s and
currently. This appears to be (so far) the mildest of the three events in terms of price increases
the withdrawal of malpractice insurer St. Paul from the
and coverage unavailability, even
market.
The crises are caused by the economic cycle of the insurance industry. The cost of
claims has been relatively flat, of the order of $11 0,000 per claim closed with payment and under
$30,000 per claim closed when those claims closed without payment are included in the averages
(as they must be since the adjustment expense for such claims is included in the data).
Thus, in order to control the periodic malpractice insurance rate flare-ups, the cycle must
be controlled. This requires the discipline of a regulator to do a very difficult thing, keep prices
somewhat higher than competition would dictate during the "soft" phase of the cycle and escrow
the excess to help when the "hard" phase sets in.
The "hard" phase is related to reinsurance becoming unavailable or high priced. This is
why a national reinsurance facility makes sense. Further, if the facility is regulated by the
federal government, the go\emment would have incentives to make sure that rates remained
actuarially sound and stable throughout the cycle and would be able to use the data on large
claims for risk reduction research.

IV. Conclm;ion
A lot is at stake in this debate. The 1999 report regarding medical errors by the Institute
on Medicine (10M) demonstrates that far too many Americans face the serious possibility of an

8

injury, or even death, due to medical mistakes in the hospital. Using the 10M's low estimate of
44,000 deaths per year, medical errors are the eighth leading cause of death in this country,
ahead of breast cancer and AIDS. The 10M's high-range estimate of98,000 deaths a year
would make medical errors the fifth leading cause of death, more than all accidental deaths. \3 Of
course, some medical errors are directly attributable to physician negligence and some are not,
but the 10M report clearly demonstrates the se~ious implications of rolling back the legal rights
of Americans who have been harmed or killed by malpractice. If Congress gets it wrong, the
pain and suffering incurred by many families across the country will only increase.
Before this Committee rushes through tort reform legislation, I urge you to get the facts.
As the evidence I've presented you with today shows, insurers have only themselves to blame for
the predicament they-and physicians and patients throughout the country-face.

13 To Err is Human. Building a Safer Health System. Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences;
November, 1999.
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EXHIBIT A: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS 1991-2000

MED MAL
AVERAGE
PREMIUM
AT 2000
DOLLARS

U.S.A.
U.S.A.
MEDICAL
NUMBER OF MALPRACTICE
PREM EARNED
DOCTORS
(in thousands)

AVERAGE
MED MAL
PREMIUM
PER DOCTOR
U.s.A.

MEDICAL
CARE
SERVICES
CPI-U
7/1 OF YEAR

4862170
5138395
5174055
5931898
6080639
5992394
5917038
6195047
6155241
6375401

7700.62
7879.77
7719.01
8667.30
8441.81
8121.98
7819.53
7963.81
7717.20
7843.75

176.1
189.7
202.6
212.6
223.5
231.9
238.7
246.5
254.6
265.6

11614.33
11032.50
10119.30
10828.01
10031.97
9302.27
8700.74
8580.88
8050.62
7843.75

1991 to 2000 PERCENT CHANGE
50.8
RATE INCREASE REQUIRED TO BRING 2000 TO 1991 PRICE LEVEL

-32.5
48.10%

YEAR
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

631400
652100
670300
684400
720300
737800
756700
777900
797600
812800

Sources:
Doctors USA: Statistical Abstract of the United States
Earned Premiums: NAIC Report on Profit By Line By State
Medical Care Services Inflation: Bureau of Labor Statistics

EXHIBIT B: RATIO OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUM COSTS
TO NATIONAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES

YEAR

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
TOTAL

DIRECT PLUS
ASSUMMED MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE
PREMIUMS EARNED 14

NATIONAL
HEALTH
EXPENDITURES 15

MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE
PREMIUM AS A %
OF HEALTH COSTS

$5322
5379
5157
5015
5127
5367
5896
6207
6190
6402
6559
6703
7360

$562,000
623,900
699,400
766,800
836,500
898,500
947,700
993,700
1,042,500
1,092,400
1,146,000
1,211,000
1,311,000

0.95%
0.86
0.74
0.65
0.61
0.60
0.62
0.66
0.59
0.59
0.57
0.55
0.56

$56,062

$8,463,400

0.66%

14 Best's Aggregates and Averages, 1998 and 2001 Editions. Figures in millions of dollars. Using direct plus assumed slightly
overstates the size of medical malpractice premiums.
15 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services web site.
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EXHIBIT C: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS BY AMERICANS 1991-2000
Claims
closed
with
Payment

Claims
closed
without
Payment

YEAR

USA Number Claims wi Total claims
pay
per 100
closed per
of Doctors
Doctors
100 Doctors

Percent of

Paid losses

Average

total claims

and LAE

Loss for all

With
payment

Expense
(000)

Claims
closed

claims only

Average
Loss
for paid

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

30841
31079
32821
31147
31237
30522
24326
17835
10419
3035

75348
82737
87728
92788
94180
92888
79178
67094
50363
22280

631400
652100
670300
684400
720300
737800
756700
777900
797600
812800

4.9
4.8
4.9
4.6
4.3
4.1
3.2
2.3
1.3
0.4

16.8
17.5
18.0
18.1
17.4
16.7
13.7
10.9
7.6
3.1

29.0
27.3
27.2
25.1
24.9
24.7
23.5
21.0
17.1
12.0

3089412
3270128
3438042
3696608
3903960
3641179
2560484
2488737
1192560
204248

29093.52
28731.71
28519.87
29826.99
31127.84
29504.73
24738.02
29303.74
19620.28
8068.26

100172.24
105219.86
104751.29
118682.63
124978.71
119296.87
105257.09
139542.30
114460.12
67297.53

TOTAL

243262

744584

7241300

3.4

13.6

24.6

27485358

27823.53

112986.65

EXHIBIT D: PREMIUMS EARNED AND LOSSES INCURRED 1976-2000

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

1- PREMIUM EARNED
6000000

-

LOSSES INCURRED

I

..-----.---..---.--.. --.. -----..----.--...-.-"....- .. ----- -.. -------...,.,.--,

5000000
4000000
3000000
2000000
1000000

o

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

YEAR

EXHIBIT E: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE PROFITABILITY
1991-2000
PROFITABILITY DATA -RETURN ON NET WORTH

NATIONAL
RETURN

YEAR

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000 5.4
Average ROR

15.9
15.5
15.3
13.7
12.7
12.6
12.6
7.6
5.1

12.3

Source: Profitability By-Line,
By-State, National Association
of Insurance Commissioners,
2000 Edition.
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PAGE ONE
Insurers' Price Wars Contributed
To Doctors Facing Soaring Costs

advertisement

Lawsuits Alone Didn't Inflate Malpractice Premiums;
Reserves at St. Paul Distorted Pricing Picture in 1990s
By RACHEL ZIMMERMAN and CHRISTOPHER OSTER
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
As medical-malpractice premiums skyrocket in about a dozen states
across the country, obstetricians and doctors in other risky specialties,
such as neurosurgery, are moving, quitting or retiring. Insurers and
many doctors blame the problem on rising jury awards in liability
lawsuits.
"The real sickness is people sue at the drop of a hat, judgments are
going up and up and up, and the people getting rich out of this are the
plaintiffs' attorneys," says David Golden of the National Association of
Independent Insurers, a trade group. The American Medical
Association says Florida, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania and eight
other states face a "crisis" because "the legal system produces
multimillion-dollar jury awards on a regular basis."
But while malpractice litigation has a big effect on premiums, insurers'
pricing and accounting practices have played an equally important role.
Following a cycle that recurs in many parts of the business, a price war
that began in the early 1990s led insurers to sell malpractice coverage
to obstetrician-gynecologists at rates that proved inadequate to cover
claims.
Price Slashing
Some of these carriers had rushed into malpractice coverage because an
accounting practice widely used in the industry made the area seem
more profitable in the early 1990s than it really was. A decade of
short-sighted price slashing led to industry losses of nearly $3 billion
last year.
"I don't like to hear insurance-company executives say it's the tort
[injury-law] system -- it's self-inflicted," says Donald J. Zuk, chief
executive of Sepie Hold!l1\!~ Inc., a leading malpractice insurer in
California.
What's more, the litigation statistics most insurers trumpet are
incomplete. The statistics come from Jury Verdict Research, a
Horsham, Pa., information service, which reports that since 1994, jury
awards for medical-malpractice cases have jumped 175%, to a median
of $1 million in 2000. During that seven-year period, the median award
for negligence in childbirth was $2,050,000 -- the highest for all types
of medical-malpractice cases, Jury Verdict Research says. (In any
group of figures, halffall above the median, and half fall below.)
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But Jury Verdict Research says its 2,95 I-case malpractice database has
large gaps. It collects award information unsystematically, and it can't
say how many cases it misses. It says it can't calculate the percentage
change in the median for childbirth-negligence cases. More important,
the database excludes trial victories by doctors and hospitals -- verdicts
that are worth zero dollars. That's a lot to ignore. Doctors and hospitals
win about 62% of the time, Jury Verdict Research says. A separate
database on settlements is less comprehensive.
A spokesman for Jury Verdict Research, Gary Bagin, confirms these
and other holes in its statistics. He says the numbers nevertheless
accurately reflect trends. The company, which sells its data to all
comers, has reported jury information this way since 1961. "If we
changed now, people looking back historically couldn't compare apples
to apples," Mr. Bagin says.
Some doctors are beginning to acknowledge that the conventional
focus on jury awards deflects attention from the insurance industry'S
behavior. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
for the first time is conceding that carriers' business practices have
contributed to the current problem, says Alice Kirkman, a
spokeswoman for the professional group. "We are admitting it's a much
more complex problem than we have previously talked about," she
says.

Scrambling for Doctors
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The upshot is beyond dispute: Pregnant women across the country are
scrambling for medical attention. Kimberly Maugaotega of Las Vegas is 13 weeks pregnant and hasn't seen
an obstetrician. When she learned she was expecting, the 33-year-old mother of two called the doctor who
delivered her second child but was told he wasn't taking any new pregnant patients. Dr. Shelby Wilbourn
plans to leave Nevada because of soaring medical-malpractice insurance rates there. Ms. Maugaotega says
she called 28 obstetricians but couldn't find one who would take her.
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Frustrated, she called the office of Nevada Gov. Kenny Guinn. A staff member
gave her yet another name. She made an appointment to see that doctor today but
says she is skeptical about the quality of care she will receive.
In the Las Vegas area, doctors say some 90 obstetricians have stopped accepting
new patients since Sl. Paul Cos., formerly the country's leading provider of
malpractice coverage, quit the business in December. St. Paul had insured more
than half of Nevada's 240 obstetricians. Carriers still offering coverage in the state
have raised rates by 100% to 400%, physicians say.

Dr. Wilbourn says his annual malpractice premium was due to jump to $108,000
next month, from $33,000. The 41-year-old solo practitioner says the increase
.::Jii,· : ',,/:;'" would come straight out of his take-home pay of between $150,000 and $200,000 a
Kimberly Maugautega year. In response, he is moving to Maine this summer.
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Dr. Wilbourn mourns having "to pick up and leave the patients I cared for and the practice I built up over
12 years." But in Maine, he has found a $200,000-a-year position with an insurance premium of only
$9,800 for the first year, although the rate rises significantly after that. Premiums in Maine are relatively
low because a dominant doctor-owned insurance cooperative there hasn't pushed to maximize rates, the
heavily rural population isn't notably litigious and its court system employs an expert panel to screen out
some suits, says Insurance Commissioner Alessandro Iuppa.
Until the 1970s, few doctors faced big-dollar suits. Malpractice coverage was a small specialty. As courts
expanded liability rules, malpractice suits became more common. Dozens of doctor-owned insurance
cooperatives, or "bedpan mutuals," formed in response. Most stuck to their home states.

St. Paul, a mid-sized national carrier named for its base in Minnesota, saw an
opportunity. An insurer of Main Street businesses, St. Paul became the leader in
the malpractice field. By 1985, it had a 20% share of the national market. Overall,
the company had revenue of $8.9 billion last year, with about 10% of its premium
dollars coming from malpractice coverage.
The frequency and size of doctors' malpractice claims rose steadily in the early
1980s, industry officials say. St. Paul and its competitors raised rates sharply
during the 1980s.
Expecting malpractice awards to continue rising rapidly, St. Paul increased its
reserves. But the company miscalculated, says Kevin Rehnberg, a senior vice
president. Claim frequency and size leveled off in the late 1980s, as more than 30
states enacted curbs on malpractice awards, Mr. Rehnberg says. The combination
of this so-called tort reform and the industry'S rate increases turned malpractice
insurance into a very lucrative specialty.
A standard industry accounting device used by St. Paul and, on a smaller scale, by its rivals, made the field
look even more attractive. Realizing that it had set aside too much money for malpractice claims, St. Paul
"released" $1.1 billion in reserves between 1992 and 1997. The money flowed through its income
statement and boosted its bottom line.
St. Paul stated clearly in its annual reports that excess reserves had enlarged its net income. But that part of
the message didn't get through to some insurers -- especially bedpan mutuals -- dazzled by St. Paul's
bottom line, according to industry officials.
In the 1990s, some bedpan mutuals began competing for business beyond their original territories. New
Jersey's Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, California's Southern California Physicians Insurance
Exchange (now known as Scpie Holdings), and Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Co., or Phico, fanned out
across the country. Some publicly traded insurers also jumped into the business.
With St. Paul seeming to offer a model for big, quick profits, "no one wanted to sit still in their own
backyard," says Scpie's Mr. Zuk. "The boards of directors said, 'We've got to grow.' " Scpie expanded into
Connecticut, Florida and Texas, among other states, starting in 1997.
As they entered new areas, smaller carriers often tried to attract customers by undercutting St. Paul. The
price slashing became contagious, and premiums fell in many states. The mutuals "went in and aggravated
the situation by saying, 'Look at all the money St. Paul is making,' " says Tom Gose, President of MAG
Mutual Insurance Co., which operates mainly in Georgia. "They came in late to the dance and undercut
everyone."
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SOARING PREMIUMS
Insurance·irdustry accoonting and pricing prac: ces have contributed to sharply rising medical-mal.:lractce rates
that are causing doctors in some states lo quit or Move .
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The newer competitors soon discovered, however, that "the so-called profitability of the '90s was the result
of those years in the mid-80s when the actuaries were predicting the terrible trends," says Donald J. Fager,
president of Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Co., a bedpan mutual started in 1975 in New York. Except
for two mergers in the past two years, his company mostly has held to its original single-state focus.
The competition intensified, even though some insurers "knew rates were inadequate from 1995 to 2000" to
cover malpractice claims, says Bob Sanders, an actuary with Milliman USA, a Seattle consultancy serving
insurance companies.

Alleged Fraud
In at least one case, aggressive pricing allegedly crossed the line into fraud. Pennsylvania regulators last
year filed a civil suit in state court in Harrisburg against certain executives and board members of Phico.
The state alleges the defendants misled the company's board on the adequacy of Phi co's premium rates and
funds set aside to pay claims. On the way to becoming the nation's seventh-largest malpractice insurer, the
company had suffered mounting losses on policies for medical offices and nursing homes as far away as
Miami.
Pennsylvania regulators took over Phi co last August. The company filed for bankruptcy-court protection
from its creditors in December. A trial date hasn't been set for the state fraud suit. Phico executives and
directors have denied wrongdoing.
In the late 1990s, the size of payouts for malpractice awards increased, carriers say. By 2000, many
companies were losing money on malpractice coverage. Industrywide, carriers paid out $1.36 in claims and
expenses for every premium dollar they collected, says Mr. Golden, the trade-group official.
The losses were exacerbated by carriers' declining investment returns. Some insurers had come to expect
that big gains in the 1990s from their bond and stock portfolios would continue, industry officials say.
When the bull market stalled in 2000, investment gains that had patched over inadequate premium rates
disappeared.

Some bedpan mutuals went home. Scpie stopped writing coverage in any state other than California. "We
lost money, and we retreated," says the company's Mr. Zuk.
New Jersey's Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, now known as MIIX, had expanded into 24 states by the
time it had a loss of $ I 64 million in the fourth quarter of 200 I. The company says it is now refusing to
renew policies for 7,000 physicians outside of New Jersey. It plans to reformulate as a new company
operating only in that state.
St. Paul's malpractice business sank into the red. Last December, newly hired Chief Executive Jay
Fishman, a former Cill!.!rt\U]1 Inc. executive, announced the company would drop the coverage line. St. Paul
reported a $980 million loss on the business for 200 I.
As carriers retrench, competition has slumped and prices in some states have shot up. Lauren Kline, 6Y2
months pregnant, changed obstetricians when her long-time Philadelphia doctor moved out of state because
of rate increases. Now, her new doctor, Robert Friedman, may have to give up delivering babies at his
suburban Philadelphia practice. His insurance expires at the end of the month, and he says he is having
difficulty finding a carrier that will sell him a policy at any price.
Last year, Dr. Friedman says he paid $50,000 for coverage. Ifhe gets a policy for next year, it will cost
$90,000, he predicts, based on his broker's estimate. "I can't pass a single bit of that off to my patients,"
because managed-care companies don't allow it, he says.
Dr. Friedman says he is considering dropping the obstetrics part of his practice. Generally, delivering
babies is seen as posing greater risks than most gynecological treatment. As a result, insurers offer
less-expensive policies to doctors who don't do deliveries.
Mr. Golden of the insurers' association argues that whatever role industry practices may play, the current
turmoil stems from lawsuits. The association says that from 1995 through 2000, total industry payouts to
cover losses and legal expenses jumped 52%, to $6.9 billion. "That says there are more really huge
verdicts," Mr. Golden says. Even in the majority of cases in which doctors and hospitals win -- the
zero-dollar verdicts -- there are still legal expenses that insurers have to pick up, he adds.
Industry critics point to different sets of statistics. Bob Hunter, director for insurance at Consumer
Federation of America, an advocacy group in Washington, prefers numbers generated by A.M. Best Co.
The insurance-rating agency estimates that once all malpractice claims from 199 I through 2000 are
resolved -- which will take until about 2010 -- the average payout per claim will have risen 47%, to
$42,473. That projection includes legal expenses and suits in which doctors or hospitals prevail.
While the statistical debate rages, pregnant women adjust to new limits and inconveniences. Kelly
Biesecker, 35, spent many extra hours on the highway this spring, driving from her home in Villanova, Pa.,
to Delran, N.J., so she could continue to use her obstetrician. Dr. Richard Krauss says he moved the
obstetrics part of his practice from Philadelphia because malpractice rates had skyrocketed in Pennsylvania.
Ms. Biesecker, who gave birth to a healthy boy on June 5, says Dr. Krauss was the doctor she trusted to
guard her health and the health of her baby: "You stick with that guy no matter what the distance."
Dr. Krauss, 53, left Philadelphia last year only after his malpractice premium rose to $54,000, from
$38,000, and then was canceled by a carrier getting out of the business, he says. After getting quotes of
about $80,000 on a new policy, he moved. New Jersey hasn't been a panacea, however. His policy there
expires July 1, and the carrier refuses to renew it. The doctor says he hopes to go to work for a hospital that
will pay for his coverage.
Write to Rachel Zimmerman at r<lchcl.zillll1lcl"lll;lIl II \\ sj .c(\rl1 and Christopher Oster at
c h rJ ~. (\~t...T' (/\\'~ i. C(l1ll
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Back on, the tort reform merry-go-round
hose of us who have been around a while are used to the
Now the insurers have reached back into their bag of tricks, pointing
cyclical nature of medical malpractice insurance.. Every 10 the finger of blame at our litigiQ~ society, The problem is, our society
.
years or so there's a huge jump in premium costs, always waJi litigious a muple of years ago, too, but we didn't see big premium
accompanied by a damor for limiting plaintiffs' rights to sue increases then, To listen to the industry and its unwitting provider allies,
and collect for pain and suffering. And each time around, providers America'4 juries go haywire every 10 years or so, only to become socially
have joined in pursuit of the wrong culprit
'
responsible once msurance profits go bacle up.
This year, the uproar is the loudest yet, and though, Congress is
The study being used to bolster such claims--c.omplled by Jury Verunlikely to adopta national tort monn law (despite the American Med- dict Research-found that since 1994, jury awards for medical malpracical Association's best efforts), governors and state legislatures from New tice cases have jumped 175%, to a median of$l million in 20()(), with the
Jersey to Nevada are scmnbling to respond.
' average settlement being $3.5 million. That's shocking. at least until you
read the fine print
For hospitals and physicians, this crisis is very real. Malpractice premiums are skyrocketing, and some doctors can't
When the Wall Sh'eet JournalQ}led, Jury Verdict admitted
even find coverage, opting to "go bare," Worst hit is obstetrics,
that its 2,951-case malpractice d'atabase has large gaps in it "It
with some physicians picking up their practices and movingto
collects award information unsystematically, and it can't say
states with lower premiums and less litigious resideAts, Hospihow many cases it misses," the Journal reported. Maury Vertals in a number of sl.ates are self-insuring and paying dearly
dict} says it can't calculate the percentage cb~ge in the
for "excess coverage" of claims 'that go beyond their set-asides.
median for childbirth. negligence cases. More important, the
Things turned dramatic earlier this month, when Univerdatabase excludes trial victories by doctors and hospitalssity Medical Center in Las Vegas closed its Level J trawna
verdicts tllat are worth zero dollars. A separate database on
center, the only such facility in a four-state region, after sur-,
'settlements is less comprehensive."
TODD
geons refused to work there unless lawmakers stopped the '
Meanwhile, a study by the Physician Insure.rsAssociation of
big malpractice awards. Nevada Gov. ICenny Guinn quickly
~OANE , America found that the average payout by indivldual de.fm..
called for a special legislative session to capitulate to the docs. .As.s/S~nt ManaKlng dants in 2000 was $328,396. Then AM. Best Co., an insurIn truth, the medical liability insurance crisis has very little to
Edltor/Op-Ed
ance-rating agency, came out with an estimate that once
do with jury awards and everything to do with an out-of-control
malpractice claims from 1991 through 2000 are resolved.
insurance induslly. Insurers such as St Paul Cos. and PHICO Insurance ' wJlich wiD take until about 2010, the average: payout per claim will have
Co, engaged in a premium price war in the 1990s, using the go-go stock risen 47%, to $42,473. That projection includes legal expenses and suits
market to cover the sprr.ld, The invested reserves grew so large that some of in which doctors or hospitals prevail This crisis is shrinking.
the funds were released to the bottom line as profit Meanwhile, PHIOO
A coaliti9t) of consumer groups and some members of Congreu
and other mutuals that had been start:d by providers overexpanded.
have called for a General Accounting Office Investigation of the insurThen the music stopped at the stodt party, leaving most "med mal" ance industry's responsibility for creating nationwide medical malinsurers scrambling. either out of the market or toward huge premium practice insurance problems for doctors. That's a start. In the longer
increases. PHlCO is in bankruptcy and its executives and directors are term. self- insurance through shared-risk pools may be: the solution, so
awaiting trial in a state fraud laWSUit.,
we don't have to go through another cycle like this one again.
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Definitions
The following tenns are used in this report:
"Medical error" or "error" - The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a
wrong action to achieve an aim. Errors can include problems in practice, products, procedures, and
systems.
"Adverse outcomes" - Undesirable and unintended outcomes of care such as death, disability, or temporary disability. 1
"Adverse events" - Undesirable and unintended incidents in care that may result in adverse outcomes or
may require additional care efforts to thwart an adverse outcome?
"Adverse drug event" - an adverse event attributable to the administration of a drug.
"Adverse event indicators" - the 3 broad and 37 refined categories indicating misadventures of surgical
and medical care, complications of surgical and medical procedures, and adverse drug events, which are
listed in Table 1.
"Preventable adverse events" - a subset of adverse outcomes that are judged to have been avoidable if
appropriate and reasonable steps had been taken. 3
"Near misses" - Events in which the unwanted consequences were prevented because the failure was
identified, and corrected. Such a recovery could be by a planned or unplanned barrier. 4
"System" - Set of interdependent elements interacting to achieve a common aim. These elements may be
both human and nonhuman (equipment, technologies, etc.). 6
"Complications of medical care"- Concurrence of injuries, lesions, or diseases with another disease
due to medical care.

11
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Executive Summary
The United States' health care system, while known to offer the most technically advanced healthcare, is
characterized by unacceptably high levels of adverse events due to medical errors. Proper investigation,
data collection and analysis are critical first steps to effective prevention.
This report is the first attempt in Utah to use the hospital discharge abstracts and International Classification
of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes, including E-codes, to estimate the
frequency of occurrence, trends and patterns of risk of adverse events related to medical care. This report
should help inform healthcare workers of the existence and potential value ofthese data, and attract their
attention to the problem of patient safety. The report also proposes a classification scheme for adverse
events, using ICD-9-CM codes. Although limited, the proposed classification should prompt dialogue and
feedback to further refine this classification scheme. In the interim, this scheme can equip analysts with a tool
to sensibly categorize adverse events.

Methods
This report captures assessments and evaluations from the 1995-99 inpatient hospital discharge abstract
from acute care hospitals in Utah. ICD-9-CM codes currently used in hospital discharge records have been
used to identify three main categories and 37 subcategories of adverse events. Tables and graphs depict
variations in numbers and rates of adverse events by risk factors such as age, sex, and hospital characteristics (urban vs. rural, teaching vs. non-teaching, and accredited by Joint Commission for Accreditation of
Health Organizations (JCAHO) vs. non-JCAHO).
Limitations
These data have important limitations, including:
•

our inability to separate adverse events prior to hospitalization from those occurring during hospitalization,

•

our inability to determine the clinical significance ofthe event, and

•

our inability to distinguish variation in completeness ofreporting from variation in true occurrence of
adverse events.

Results
•

From 1995 to 1999 in Utah, about one in 250 hospital discharges or 4,248 patients had a "misadventure of surgical and medical care," (a term used in the ICD-9-CM Codes Book to imply that
the event occurred as a result of an error) with an overwhelming majority ofthose (93% or 3,939
discharges) comprising cuts, punctures, or perforations during medical care.

•

A total of 60,000 (6 % of all discharges) involved other adverse events (ICD-9-CM category
"complications of medical and surgical procedures").

•

Finally, 25,000 discharges (2.5 %) involved complications of medications. (See Table 1)

111

•

No substantial annual variation existed for any ofthe adverse events (See page 13.)

•

A slightly greater proportion of males suffered adverse events than females. However, the actual
number of adverse events was considerably higher for women because they were hospital more
often than men (See page 14.)

•

The rate of adverse events increased substantially with age. Older patients were at a higher risk,
probably because they tended to have more complex conditions than other patients. (See page 16.)

•

Patients in urban hospitals, teaching hospitals, and JCAHO-accredited hospitals reported higher
rates of adverse events, particularly complications of medications. This is likely due to higher volume
and acuity of patients, and possibly more accurate reporting of adverse events (See page 18.)

Conclusions
There is growing recognition that the health care system is not as safe as it can be. Information about
frequency of errors and other adverse events is needed to guide and evaluate improvement in the healthcare
system. This report used the available data from the Utah Hospital Discharge Database to provide information on adverse events during medical care.
Despite their limitations, these data add to the evidence presented in the Institute of Medicine 's report, "To
Error is Human", that the healthcare system can be made safer. The Utah Department of Health has been
working in partnership with Utah hospitals and healthcare providers, to address this challenge. The Utah
Hospital Association (UHA),jointiy with Utah Medical Association, HealthInsight, and Utah Department of
Health (UDOH), has organized a Utah Hospital Patient Safety Task Force
As part of its efforts, that Task Force has helped the Utah Department of Health to develop two proposed
administrative rules. One ofthese proposed rules would call upon hospitals to establish a mechanism to
prevent adverse drug events. The other calls upon hospitals to report sentinel health events and establish a
review process for such events designed to identifY and remedy their root causes. The Utah Department of
Health's Utah Health Data Committee is committed to work collaboratively with these parties to provide
information to assist with these efforts.

IV

49

Medical Mistakes Make Life Busier for E.~.
,
'bed drugs bring thousands to hOSPItalS
Utah Health Department says errors, allergIes to prescn
.
BY NORMA WAGNER
© 2000. THE SALT LAKE TRlBUNg

A state Department of Health analys.is
shows thousands of Utahns end up m
hospital emergency rooms for care cost·
ing more than $40 ~illion ~cause of
mistakes made durmg medlcal treat·
ment, mostly medication errors but also
side effects from the drugs they are
prescribed.
For the second year in a row, the
health department analyzed records from

hospitals statewide in an effort to design
prevention
programs
to. reduce
emergency· room visits, whlch cost
nearly $700 million in 1997 - the latest
year for which such emergency·room
data has been compiled.
.
"The adverse effects of medl~ eat·
ment constituted 4.7 percent of all mJury·
and poisoning·related emergency depart·
ment encounters, claiming a total charge
of $40,076,396," said Don Wood, program
director of the Bureau of Emergency
Medical Services. "So the adverse effects

t:
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Medical Errors
Bring Thousands
To Hospitals
• Continued from A-I
end up in the emergency room."
Still, the data is not specific
enough yet to discern which problems resulted from poor medical
care or simply a patient's bad reaction to the drug they were pre·
scribed, Wood pointed out.
"We know the majority are
medication administration problems, but it doesn't mean that all of
them were given a wrong medication or dose," Wood said. "Some
could result from an allergic reaction to the medication. Give us five
years and we'll start getting there,
figuring it out."
Wood and his colleagues also
analyzed 1996 emergency·room de·
partment data, but he said two
years' worth of number· crunching
does not leave much room for ana·
lyzing trends. The number of
emergency·room visits in 1996

ihbuV\:e, DcL ?-I,

of medical treatment really stuck out.
"It can be anything from the guy who
has a sponge left in him from surgery
who leaves the hospital and a day late:
has an infee'j'.m , .. to probl<:m.s asS?Cl'
ated with n ..:dication admmlstration
problems, the wrong medicat~on or the
wrong dose and not necessru:il~ by the
hospital, but by a private physlclan or an
urgent care clinic. And these people get
charged for that mistake because they

Sec MEDICAL, Page A-6
7-000,

involved 502,000 patients, compared with 562,000 in 1997.
The total charges for outpatient
treatment for adverse effects from
medical treatment increased from
$29 million to $40 million, "but
there were 60,000 more patients in
1997," Wood said, "and the cost of
medicine goes up every year."
What struck him equally in the
report was the utilization ofhospital emergency rooms, though no
other state he knows of gathers the
data so it is hard to tell how Utah
compares.
"What we do know is that about
one in four Utahns utilizes the
emergency room for whatever reason. It may be that they don't have
insurance or they're under insured
so they use the E.R., or they don't
have a primary care physician," he
said. "Then we also have all these
motor vehicle accidents and a
whole slew of other reasons that
result in trauma. We're a recre·
ation state, after all. Look at all the
opportunities we have for injury.
Maybe that's why we have such a
high number of falls. "
Falls and car crashes were
logged among the most frequent
causes of unintentional injury that
required hospitalization. with an

y, At.

average charge of $8,286 for falls
and $13,808 for motor vehicle
accidents.
Wood said hospitals, which pro·
vide his department with the information, can use the Utah Emer·
gency Department Encounter Data
Report to better gear their services
to provide better care for their patients and, along with the Health
Department, use the date to plan
prevention programs.
"If the report shows that of the
100,000 people coming into their
emergency room every year are
geriatric patients, they may want
to focus more on geriatric treatment," Wood said.
"If Primary Children's Medical
Center starts seeing increasing
numbers of injuries due to falls,
whether it's a 1·to-4·year·old falling
ofr steps or a 10-to·12-year-old fall.ing otT their Rollerblades, they can
look at that and do something with
it.
"That's what we're here to do."
As Wood's bureau has grown
accustomed to crunching the data,
it is getting better at it, and faster.
"We expect the 1998 report to be
done within 60 to 90 days," he said,
"and to be right up to date with this
information one year from now."

If you are interested in purchasing the
increased MEDEFENSE limits or would
like an application to apply for the
separate "BILLING ERRORS AND
OMISSIONS COVERAGE" and have
not received a separate mailing with a
postcard to change or add this additional
coverage please contact Marlene
Hotchkiss or Stewart Pierce at 801-5310375 or 1-800-748-4380.

In 2000, the Claim Department
opened 394 new claims and closed 380
claims. Of claims closed, 32% involved a
settlement payment to patients; 68%
closed without a payment to the patient.
Of the closed claims in 2000, five
went to trial and were all defense verdicts
in favor of the physician. The cost to
defend these five claims was $637,600.
The average cost for these five claims
was $127,500 with the low being $34,900
and the high $213,000.

Claim Summary 2000
UMIA is committed to
communicating as much information as
possible to our members about issues that
impact health care professionals. Many of
our members have expressed an interest
in receiving information about the Claim
Department activity and want to be kept
abreast of claims as they develop.

Claims by Specialty

10 year Claim data 1991 -2000
During the past ten years from
January 1, 1991 through December 31,
2000 there have been 3,263 claim
reported to UMIA. During this 10-year
time frame 825 claims closed with a
payment and 2,438 closed without any
payment being made. Our reported
claims for the past 10 years are listed by
medical specialty and the type of claims
below.

Type of Claims
IOB/GYN

383

ISurgery

I Family Practice

IGeneral Surgery

1

Post-op Complications

483

Surgical error/injury

440
93

Retained foreign body

IFailure/delay Diagnose

ICancer
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I
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~1

IFracture/dislocation
IInfection

1

1

1

1Cardiac related

IPregnancy related
I

228

1

I

I

138
110 1

I

69 1

II

25 1

I

I
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UI

Other

398 1

Improper Treatment

IDrug side effect
Insufficient Therapy

IIncorrect medication

ICardiology
! Otolaryngology

48

! Urgent Care

34

!vascular Surgery

1

IPsychiatry
INeurology
IGynecoolgy

I
I
I
I

32 1
30 1
28 1

Fracture/dislocation
Lack of supervision

IInfection
IX-ray related
IDuring exam

1

141

1

81

28 1

ology

Obstetrical birth injury

188

Anesthesia related

136

I

60

Fen/Phen

ConsenVConfidentiality
Abandonment

3263

IEquipment failure
IOther
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